Atreides Management / Atreides Foundation Fund: Hedge Fund Diligence (First Pass)
Prepared 2026-10-21 from the files in sources/. This run supersedes the 2026-10-20 note. It adds four monthly portfolio summaries (December 2025 to March 2026) and the Q1 2026 investor call deck (dated 23 April 2026), none of which the earlier note used. The newest data point is 31 March 2026. The newest offering memorandum and Form ADV are still from March 2022, and the only DDQ is from August 2020. This is a first-pass note, not full investment diligence, not ODD, and not a recommendation.
Source key: Q1-26 Q1 2026 Investor Call deck, 23 Apr 2026 (image-only screen captures, watermarked) · PS26 Standard Portfolio Summaries, Dec 2025 and Jan–Mar 2026 (monthly) · L26 Investor Letter, 4 Feb 2026 · Est25 Estimated Month End Returns, Dec 2025 · PS25 Standard Portfolio Summaries, Dec 2024–Nov 2025 (monthly) · Q2-25 / Q3-25 Investor call decks, 2025 (image-only) · EXP Portfolio Summaries Oct 2023–Apr 2024 ("Exposure" files) · OM22 Confidential Offering Memorandum, Onshore LP and Offshore Ltd, Mar 2022 · ADV22 Form ADV 2A/2B, 31 Mar 2022 · ADV21 Form ADV 2A, 31 Mar 2021 · Deck21 Presentation, Dec 2021 · Deck20 Presentation, May 2020 · L21 Annual Letter, 8 Feb 2021 · L20 Annual Letter, Jun 2020 · PS20 Portfolio Summaries Nov and Dec 2020 · DDQ20 DDQ, Aug 2020 · SuppA Offshore Supplement, Sub-Class A shares (dated Apr 2019) · Email21 Atreides IR responses to VS Partners ODD follow-ups, 19 Jan 2021 · OTC Novus analysis of Fidelity OTC Portfolio, Jun 2020
1. First Impression
What it is. Atreides runs a TMT- and consumer-focused long/short equity fund launched 15 May 2019 by Gavin Baker, who ran the Fidelity OTC Fund from 2009 to 2017 DDQ20 p.4, 7. The fund runs high gross exposure (about 250–275% in the last six months) at moderate net (36–66%), and it aims to win on long-short spread rather than market direction PS26; L26 p.3. A crossover share class (A-3) also holds private companies under a 20% (plus 4% follow-on) limit OM22 pp.8–9; PS26 Mar fn.23. The master fund held $3.94B at 31 March 2026: $2.5B in the crossover class and $1.4B public-only PS26 Mar; Q1-26 p.3. Firm vehicles also include Special Circumstances co-invest ($1.84B), Private Opportunities Fund I ("Arrakis", $246M) and a new 150/50 Technology fund ($88M) PS26 Mar.
What changed since the 2026-10-20 note.
- Q1 2026 was the second-worst quarter since inception. A-1 (public only) lost 20.8% net against a NASDAQ loss of 7.0% PS26 Mar; Q1-26 p.6. The manager's table shows a net long/short spread of −17.0% for the quarter, worse than any calendar year, including 2021 (about −14.5%) Q1-26 p.2.
- The crossover class went the other way. A-3 gained 11.6% net in Q1 on private mark-ups. The private book's mark rose from $801M to $1,547M between November 2025 and March 2026, while cost rose only from $546M to $642M PS25 Nov; PS26 Mar; Q1-26 p.3.
- The long-run record now trails the index on a risk-adjusted basis. Through March 2026, A-1 has compounded at 13.4% a year against the NASDAQ's 17.1%. My return/volatility figure is 0.74 for the fund and 0.87 for the index, which reverses the edge shown in the earlier note PS26 Mar p.2.
- The manager's inception-to-date short-book statistics were restated. These figures fell far more between the June 2025 and March 2026 decks than nine months of results can explain (Section 4).
Why it's still worth a meeting. There are 6.9 years of live record across a COVID rally, a growth bear market, a recovery and an AI bull market. Long-side stock selection shows strong years (2020, 2024, 2025), and the service-provider set is institutional Q1-26 p.2; DDQ20 pp.10–11; Deck21 p.16. The meeting is now mainly about drawdown behaviour, short-book design and private-mark governance, not about upside.
Biggest gaps.
- No return or exposure data after 31 March 2026.
- No explanation of the restated inception-to-date spread figures.
- What share of crossover NAV the privates represent at mark (my arithmetic suggests about 60%, against a reported 22% "utilization").
- Stale legal and ODD documents: DDQ 2020, OM and ADV 2022.
2. Team
| Person | Role (latest source) | Background (per sources) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gavin Baker | Managing Partner & CIO; majority owner; managing member of IM GP DDQ20 p.6 | Fidelity 1999–2017; OTC Fund PM Jul 2009–Sep 2017; earlier sector PM and analyst roles ADV22 2B | Sole PM; sole key person in OM OM22 p.21 |
| Neil Desai | MD, Public Equities & Partner, Atreides Ventures Q2-25 PDF p.41 | Putnam | Not in 2021 roster |
| James Stanzler | MD, Public Equities & Partner, Atreides Ventures | Highfields (9 yrs), Loch DDQ20 p.9 | Since Apr 2019 |
| Hilary Natoff | MD, Public Equities & Head of Quality Growth | Fidelity International DDQ20 p.8 | Since Jul 2019 |
| Shane Sandoval | MD, Public Equities & Head of Technology | Garelick, ShawSpring DDQ20 p.8 | Analyst in 2019; promoted |
| Andrew Perlman | Head of ECM & Partner, Atreides Ventures | Allen & Co, BlackRock Deck21 p.21 | Joined Jul 2021 |
| David Finn | CFO | Frontlight, HMC ODD, Wellington DDQ20 p.7 | Since Jan 2019 |
| Laura Malone | GC & CCO since Sep 2021 | Numeric Deck21 p.20 | Replaced Dunyelle Rosen |
Facts. Headcount was 14 at the February 2021 soft-close and 28 in February 2026 L26 p.4. The July 2025 org chart shows about 13 investment and trading staff, all reporting to Baker Q2-25 PDF p.41. Visible departures are the original GC/CCO, the IR head and one analyst, none explained Deck21 p.20; Q2-25 PDF p.41. The Q1 2026 deck contains no org chart, so nothing newer is available.
Read. Baker is the only named PM, approves every trade and is the only key person in the OM DDQ20 p.18; OM22 p.21. He frames the team, not process, as the edge L26 pp.29–30. Q1 2026's response to losses, which was to add sharply to the losing names (Section 6), reads as a single-decision-maker call. Key-person risk is high.
3. Terms, Liquidity and Alignment
| A-1 (public only) | A-2 (public only) | A-3 (crossover) | A-4 (placement-agent class) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mgmt fee | 1.75% | 1.50% | 1.50% | 1.50% |
| Performance allocation | 19% | 17% | 15% | 15% |
| Hurdle | 3% annual, reset yearly, no carve-out once cleared SuppA PDF p.3 | same | same | same |
| HWM | Loss Recovery Sub-Account OM22 p.12 | |||
| Lock-up | None | 2 yrs, 5% early charge | 3 yrs, 5% early charge | 3 yrs, 5% |
| Liquidity | Quarterly, 60 days' notice, 50% investor-level gate | Quarterly, 25% gate | Quarterly, 25% gate; private sleeve not withdrawable until realized | Quarterly, 25% gate |
Sources: OM22 pp.4–5; Deck21 p.16; DDQ20 p.14. The minimum is $3M OM22 p.6. On a key-person event, LPs may withdraw liquid capital within a year; the private sleeve is excluded OM22 pp.21–22. Co-investments via Special Circumstances carry 0% management fee and 12% carry Deck21 p.16; PS26 Mar fn.16.
New since the last note. The 150/50 Technology Master Fund is live, at $47M in January and $88M in March 2026 PS26. Private Opportunities Fund II had a first close scheduled for 24 April 2026 Q1-26 p.4. No terms for either are in sources/.
Alignment, as evidenced.
- Positives. Baker has invested the "overwhelming majority" of his liquid net worth Deck21 p.3. Internal capital was 3% of fund AUM in January 2021 Email21. Fees on privates are charged on the lower of cost or fair value, and performance fees only on realization Email21; SuppA PDF p.11.
- Gaps and frictions. Current GP and employee capital is not disclosed. Atreides Parties pay no fees OM22 p.2. The hurdle is low. The OM permits side letters with "more favorable" rights OM22 pp.6–7.
- The crossover liquidity question is sharper now. The crossover class is $2.5B and the privates are marked at $1,547M Q1-26 p.3; PS26 Mar. If both figures are on the same basis, about 60% of A-3 NAV is in illiquid, internally valued privates. That is my arithmetic, not a manager figure. The reported "Private Utilization" is 22.05%, and the summary doesn't show how that reconciles with the marks PS26 Mar fn.23. A-3 holders can't redeem the private sleeve until realization, so this goes to liquidity and to how fairly A-3 and A-1 holders are treated.
4. Performance and Drawdowns
Reported net returns. A-1 is the highest-fee public-only class, for a day-one investor PS26 Mar p.1–2.
| 2019* | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Q1 2026 | ITD ann. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A-1 net | 9.0% | 68.3% | −8.1% | −27.6% | 21.9% | 43.4% | 40.5% | −20.8% | 13.4% |
| A-3 net (crossover) | 8.3% | 69.0% | 3.0% | −15.1% | 5.3% | 29.3% | 46.9% | 11.6% | 20.3% |
| NASDAQ Composite TR | 16.8% | 45.1% | 22.2% | −32.5% | 44.7% | 29.6% | 21.2% | −7.0% | 17.1% |
| Net L/S relative spread Q1-26 p.2 | 5.9% | 33.5% | ~−14.5% | ~−6.2% | −0.1% | 19.3% | 20.5% | −17.0% | −3.1% |
From 15 May 2019. All figures unaudited per the summaries. 2025 is now final at 40.46%, matching the December estimate Est25. ITD figures are the manager's, and my compounding of the monthly nets agrees. The 2021–22 spread figures are partly hidden by the watermark, so they are read from Q2-25 p.3.
Monthly picture of Q1 2026 PS26:
| Month | A-1 net | NASDAQ | Long attribution | Short attribution | Gross / net at month-end |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 2026 | −7.13% | +0.97% | +0.26% | −7.39% | 275% / 54% |
| Feb 2026 | −6.31% | −3.33% | −4.12% | −2.19% | 249% / 54% |
| Mar 2026 | −9.02% | −4.68% | −12.12% | +3.10% | 263% / 66% |
Computed from the A-1 monthly nets (my figures, not the manager's):
- The maximum drawdown is still −40.1% (May 2021 to December 2022). Q1 2026 is −20.8% from the December 2025 high, and nothing in the sources says whether it has recovered.
- The worst three-month windows are April–June 2022 (−21.0%) and Q1 2026 (−20.8%).
- Beta is about 0.61, correlation 0.66, up-capture about 68% and down-capture about 57%.
- Return per unit of volatility is 0.74 for the fund against 0.87 for the NASDAQ. Through December 2025 it was 1.03 against 0.97.
Claims vs. evidence.
- "Sharpe ratio more than 50% higher than the NASDAQ's" ITD L26 p.1. This used gross daily returns of the public book L26 endnote 4. It was already narrow on a net basis at year-end 2025 and is reversed after Q1 2026. The manager's own ITD Sharpe fell from 0.85 (June 2025) to 0.71 (March 2026) Q2-25 p.3; Q1-26 p.2.
- Restatement of ITD spread figures. The same table in two decks gives:
| ITD annualized | Through Jun 2025 Q2-25 p.3 | Through Mar 2026 Q1-26 p.2 |
|---|---|---|
| Gross short relative | +1.05% | −5.80% |
| Net short relative | −3.19% | −14.93% |
| Gross L/S spread | +20.64% | +14.46% |
| Net L/S spread | +7.64% | −3.06% |
Calendar 2025 gross short relative was −0.18% and Q1 2026 was −13.22% Q1-26 p.2. Those nine months can't move a six-year annualized figure from +1.05% to −5.80%; my estimate is that it would take roughly a 38% relative loss. The CY2024 net spread also changed, from 17.96% to 19.28%. This looks like a methodology change or restatement. It should be explained before any spread figure is relied on.
- Crossover adds value. A-3 leads A-1 by about 7 points a year ITD, but the lead depends on Q4 2025–Q1 2026 marks. A-3 gained 16.1% in December 2025 alone PS26 Dec. The Q1 2026 top private contributors (gross) were a stealth networking company (+326%), a stealth semiconductor company (+216%), Cerebras (+146%), DriveNets (+53%) and SpaceX (+25%). The detractors were Genvid (−57%) and Carbon Health (−100%) Q1-26 p.3. The Foundation Fund's private net IRR rose from 11.3% (November 2025) to 25.9% (March 2026) PS25 Nov; PS26 Mar. Marks are set by Atreides' Valuation Committee "in its sole discretion" PS26 Mar fn.21. Arrakis shows 0.3x DPI Q1-26 p.4, so little has been realized.
Are drawdowns explainable? The manager explains Q1 2026; 2021 remains unexplained.
- Q1 2026, per the manager Q1-26 pp.6, 12: there was a "negative two-way alpha" and about 23 points of gross headwind from "higher beta longs underperforming our higher beta shorts". Three positions drove it:
- ALAB and CRDO lagged comparable-beta AI stocks by 74 points at about 15% exposure, costing 11.3 points.
- SK Hynix and MU lagged broader memory by 54 points at about 17% exposure, costing 9.2 points.
- Unity lagged a video-game basket by 32 points at about 8% exposure, costing 2.6 points.
The deck also cites sub-sector correlations that "blew out", which made pair hedges fail Q1-26 p.7. This is a coherent account of basis risk. It is also the same failure the strategy says it is built to avoid, now seen in 2021, 2022 and Q1 2026.
- Short book in a down tape. Shorts lost 7.4 points in January while the NASDAQ rose, and another 2.2 points in February while it fell PS26. On my arithmetic sum of the monthly figures, Q1 longs cost about 16 points and shorts about 6.5 points.
- 2021–22. These remain as in the earlier note. The manager calls 2022 "my biggest mistake since starting Atreides" L26 p.4 fn.6, and no 2021 or 2022 annual letter is in
sources/.
5. Strategy and Edge
Stated approach. The long book targets the highest 5–7 year IRRs on EV/FCF DDQ20 pp.14–16. Shorts are paired with fundamentally and quantitatively similar names to strip out basis risk L21 p.11; L26 p.30. Private and venture work is described as an information edge for the public book L26 pp.3–4.
Current book (end Q1 2026). The five largest positions are Astera Labs 13.6%, Unity 10.7%, Ciena 9.7%, Micron 9.5% and Nvidia 8.0% of NAV, about 51% in total Q1-26 pp.39–43. Semiconductors were 47% long and 34% net, and software was 37% long and 28% net PS26 Mar. The deck's theses are AI-infrastructure scaling (scale-up switching, optics and copper, DRAM, Trainium), AI-native software growth, and a call that "Technology stocks are cheap" Q1-26 pp.13–14, 21, 31–32.
Claim / evidence / still to diligence.
| Claim | Evidence in sources | Still to diligence |
|---|---|---|
| Edge is insight plus domain knowledge in TMT | ITD gross long relative +20.3% a year, net +11.9% Q1-26 p.2 | Attribution by analyst and theme; how much is AI-factor exposure |
| Shorts hedge basis risk | ITD net short relative −14.9% a year on the restated basis; spread negative in 2021, 2022 and Q1 2026 Q1-26 p.2 | Restatement; short-book design when correlations break |
| Crossover improves public decisions | Anecdotes (Ciena, Lumentum) L26 p.4; ALAB realized IRR +545% gross since its IPO Q1-26 p.9 | Whether private marks reflect transactions; privates' share of A-3 at mark |
| Risk is managed via BARRA, custom betas and LLCC | Described L21 p.11; L26 p.31 | Limits that bind; why net rose from 36% to 66% during a losing quarter |
Read. The long book shows real selection skill over a full cycle. The short book has not shown that it adds value, and the edge's main failure mode, high-beta longs lagging their paired shorts, has now appeared three times. The strategy looks increasingly like a concentrated, levered long AI-infrastructure book with a short overlay.
6. Portfolio, Risk and Capacity
| Date | Gross | Net | Longs / shorts | Top 10 longs (% of public NAV) | Feeder AUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 2020 PS20 | 262% | 42% | 37 / 42 | 77% | $1.13B |
| Oct 2023 EXP | 197% | 57% | 29 / 49 | 89% | $2.39B |
| Dec 2024 PS25 | 227% | 43% | 50 / 71 | 63% | $3.03B |
| Nov 2025 PS25 | 253% | 60% | 62 / 62 | 75% | $4.01B |
| Dec 2025 PS26 | 264% | 36% | 55 / 66 | 74% | $4.27B |
| Jan 2026 PS26 | 275% | 54% | 56 / 60 | 84% | $3.88B |
| Feb 2026 PS26 | 249% | 54% | 56 / 47 | 77% | $3.90B |
| Mar 2026 PS26 | 263% | 66% | 57 / 53 | 85% | $3.92B |
Shorts include baskets and index futures. Exposures exclude privates. Feeder AUM is onshore plus offshore.
Stated guidelines vs. observed.
- Gross and net. The guideline was gross 125–250% and net 25–65% Deck20 p.20. January 2026 gross (275%) and March 2026 net (66%) were above both.
- Single names. The internal cap is 15% DDQ20 p.18. Astera Labs was at 13.6% after the firm raised its share ownership 94% during Q1, and Unity rose 73% Q1-26 pp.6, 39–40. Top-10 long concentration hit 85%, the highest since October 2023.
- Response to loss. The deck's "actions taken" were adding to the detractors and "optimized net length" Q1-26 p.6. Net rose 30 points over the quarter. That is conviction-led, and it raises the stakes on being right.
- Private sleeve. At March 2026: 79 companies, $642M cost, $1,547M mark, 22.05% reported utilization PS26 Mar.
AUM flows (inference). Feeder AUM fell about 8% from December to March, while public classes fell about 21% and A-3 rose 12% PS26. Flows are not broken out, so I can't tell net subscriptions from the A-3 mark-up.
Capacity. The firm paused at $750M (June 2020), soft-closed at about $2.4B (February 2021) and is now expanding with the 150/50 fund, a Low Net product and Private Opportunities Fund II L20 p.2; L21 pp.2–3; L26 pp.4–6; PS26; Q1-26 p.4. At about $3.9B and 263% gross, public gross exposure is about $10B by my estimate. The firm's own LLCC framework says a fund should hold only one of liquidity, leverage, concentration or crowdedness at a time L26 p.31. The March 2026 book is levered and more concentrated at once.
Other conflicts disclosed ADV22 Items 4, 10; DDQ20 p.10; OM22 p.8: separately managed accounts and model advice; Valor ties, including the Valor Atreides AI Fund; Baker's private-company board seats; and James Star's dual role on the advisory committee and the offshore board.
7. Key Counterparties and ODD Snapshot
| Function | Provider (as last disclosed) | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Administrator | Morgan Stanley Fund Services | 2020–2021 DDQ20; Deck21 |
| Auditor | KPMG LLP | 2021 Deck21 |
| Prime brokers | Goldman Sachs; Morgan Stanley | 2021 Deck21 |
| Legal | Morgan Lewis; Ogier (Cayman) | 2020 DDQ20 |
| Compliance consultant | Optima Partners; ComplySci | 2020 DDQ20 |
| Private valuation | Third-party agent (unnamed); Valuation Committee has final say | Jan 2021 Email21; Mar 2026 PS26 Mar fn.21 |
| Offshore board | John D'Agostino, Jason Fitzgerald, James Star (interested) | 2020 DDQ20 |
ADV Item 9 reported no disciplinary events as of March 2022 ADV22. Every provider entry is three to five years old. Given the size of the Q4 2025–Q1 2026 private mark-ups, the identity and scope of the valuation agent is now the top ODD item.
8. Known / Unknown / Ask Next
| Area | What We Know | What We Don't Know | Ask Next |
|---|---|---|---|
| Team | Baker is sole PM and majority owner; 28 staff; 4 MDs | Decision rights below Baker; turnover reasons; succession | Current org chart; who can size or cut risk |
| Terms/Liquidity | 2022 OM terms; quarterly with gates; A-3 privates locked until realized | Current OM; terms of the 150/50, Low Net and APOF II vehicles; side letters | Current OM, supplements, side-letter and MFN summary |
| Performance | Monthly nets through Mar 2026; Q1 2026 −20.8%; ITD 13.4% vs NASDAQ 17.1% | Returns after Mar 2026; reason for restated ITD spread; dollar-weighted returns | Monthly nets since Mar 2026; restated spread series with methodology |
| Strategy/Edge | Long alpha positive ITD; short alpha negative; basis-risk failures in 2021, 2022 and Q1 2026 | Factor-adjusted alpha; whether pair-hedge design changed after Q1 | BARRA attribution by year; short book by single names vs baskets |
| Risk/Exposures | Monthly gross/net through Mar 2026; top 5 = 51% of NAV | Hard limits; whether 275% gross or 66% net breached any limit | Written risk limits and breach log for Q1 2026 |
| Capacity | New products launching while flagship is about $3.9B | Allocation policy across vehicles | Capacity estimate and allocation policy |
| ODD/Counterparties | 2020–21 provider list | Current providers; valuation agent; SOC reports | Current DDQ, ADV, audited financials 2023–2025 |
| Alignment | Baker's "overwhelming majority" of liquid net worth | Current GP capital; privates' share of A-3 NAV at mark | GP capital by vehicle; A-3 private exposure at mark vs cost |
9. Diligence Questions
Incentive Alignment
- How much partner and employee capital is in each vehicle today, including the new 150/50 fund and the A-3 class?
- What share of A-3 NAV are privates at mark, and how does that reconcile with the 22.05% utilization figure?
Edge & Repeatability
- Why did the inception-to-date short and spread figures change between the June 2025 and March 2026 decks? Which series is correct?
- After three episodes of high-beta longs lagging paired shorts, what has changed in hedge construction?
Performance & Drawdowns
- What were returns from April 2026 onward? Has A-1 regained its December 2025 high?
- Why did net exposure rise from 36% to 66% during Q1 2026, and who signed off?
Private Marks
- What drove the stealth networking (+326%) and semiconductor (+216%) mark-ups: priced rounds or models? Did the third-party agent review them?
- How much A-3 performance fee accrued on unrealized gains, if any?
Team Stability
- Who besides Baker can initiate, size or exit a position?
- Why did the original GC/CCO and IR head leave?
Risk, Financing & Capacity
- What are the hard limits on single-name, gross and net exposure? Were any breached in Q1 2026?
- At about $10B public gross, how many days would it take to halve gross?
10. Reference Check Prep
Current investors. How was Q1 2026 communicated, and how quickly? How do A-3 holders view the private marks and liquidity?
Former investors. Did you redeem after 2022 or in 2026, and why? Were gates or holdbacks applied?
Former employees. Does Baker decide alone on sizing and risk? Why did people leave? Do privates and new vehicles pull attention from the public book?
Service providers. Did the administrator or valuation agent challenge any private mark in Q4 2025–Q1 2026? Have there been NAV restatements or late audits?
11. Suggested Materials Request List
- Monthly net returns for all classes since March 2026, plus exposure history
- A restated ROIC spread table with methodology, reconciling the June 2025 and March 2026 decks
- Private-book schedule: mark vs cost by company, valuation basis (round, model), agent sign-off, Q4 2025–Q1 2026 mark changes
- A-3 privates at mark as % of crossover NAV, monthly since 2024
- Current DDQ, Form ADV Part 2A/2B and audited financials for 2022–2025
- Current OM and supplements; term sheets for the 150/50, Low Net and APOF II vehicles
- Written risk limits and any Q1 2026 breach log
- Annual attribution by long, short, theme and analyst, plus BARRA factor attribution
- GP and employee capital by vehicle
- Org chart with joiners and leavers since 2021, and the succession plan
- AUM and flows by vehicle; dollar-weighted returns by cohort
- Annual letters 2021–2024, including the 5-year anniversary letter
- Service-provider list, SOC 1 reports, insurance schedule
- An unprotected copy of "Quarterly Top Positions"
12. Sources Reviewed
All files below are in Atreides_Foundation/sources/. Dates are document dates unless noted.
New in this run:
- Q1 2026 Investor Call deck, 23 Apr 2026 (43 pp., image-only; reviewed visually; pp.1–12 and 39–43 relied on, the macro and AI pages treated as the manager's views)
- Standard Portfolio Summaries, Dec 2025, Jan, Feb and Mar 2026 (4 files)
- 2025 Q2 Investor Call deck p.3, re-read to compare the spread table
Carried from the 2026-10-20 run (citations re-used, monthly nets re-checked against the March 2026 summary):
- Investor Letter, 4 Feb 2026 (PDF; the .docx copy is a duplicate)
- Estimated Month End Returns, Dec 2025
- Standard Portfolio Summaries, Dec 2024 and Jan–Nov 2025
- 2025 Q3 Investor Call deck
- Portfolio Summaries ("Exposure" files), Oct 2023–Apr 2024
- Confidential Offering Memoranda (Onshore LP and Offshore Ltd), Mar 2022; Sub-Class A supplements and subscription documents
- Form ADV Part 2A/2B, Mar 2022, Mar 2021 and an earlier version
- Presentations, Dec 2021 and May 2020; Annual Letters, Feb 2021 and Jun 2020
- DDQ, Aug 2020; Code of Ethics, Dec 2020; Compliance Manual TOC, May 2020
- "Investor breakdown" e-mail thread, Jan 2021; MSFS e-mail, Apr 2021
- Portfolio Summaries Nov and Dec 2020; Sample Portfolio 2020.12.xlsx
- Novus analysis of the Fidelity OTC Portfolio, Jun 2020
- Reflections on Generative AI, Jun 2023, and the Jul 2022 ventures .pptx (not relied on)
Not readable: "Quarterly Top Positions.xlsx" is password-encrypted.
Not used as evidence: analysis/ (two spreadsheets) and transcripts/ (seven call transcripts, 2020–2024) sit outside sources/ and were treated as prior work. If the transcripts are primary call records, moving them into sources/ would let a future run cite them.
No Coverage File exists for this fund.
Not available: data after 31 March 2026; annual letters for 2021–2024; audited financials; any DDQ, OM or ADV dated after March 2022. No web sources were consulted.
Method: All computed statistics (drawdown, capture, beta, return/vol, quarterly attribution sums, privates' share of A-3) are mine, from the reported monthly figures in PS26 and Q1-26.