Waha Investment / Waha Emerging Markets Credit Fund SP: Hedge Fund Diligence (First Pass)
Waha Investment / Waha Emerging Markets Credit Fund SP: Hedge Fund Diligence (First Pass)
Prepared 2026-10-20 from the 33 files in sources/. The newest evidence is the January 2026 factsheet; the DDQ data is as of August 2025 and the offering documents are dated October 2024. Nothing here covers February–October 2026, so performance, AUM, team and entity facts are roughly nine months stale. No audited financials, attribution, risk reports or regulatory filings were in the folder. The manager is UAE-based and not on EDGAR. This is a first-pass note, not full investment diligence, not ODD, and not a recommendation.
Source key: [DDQ] Due Diligence Questionnaire (file named "Q4 2025", cover says "Q3 2025", investor data as of 31 Aug 2025) · [Deck-Dec25] / [Deck-Sep25] investor presentations, Dec and Sep 2025 · [PPM] Waha Investment Management Company SPC PPM, Oct 2024 · [Supp] Fund SP Supplement, Oct 2024 · [Sub] Non-US Subscription Form (refers to the Oct 2024 PPM) · [FS-MmmYY] monthly factsheets, 25 issues from Mar 2020 to Jan 2026 (named "CEEMEA Credit Fund" until mid-2023)
Computed figures. Figures marked (calc) are my arithmetic from the monthly net return table in [FS-Jan26] or the portfolio statistics in each factsheet. The manager did not publish them.
1. First Impression
What it is. A Cayman segregated portfolio that runs a long/short, rates- and FX-hedged, relative-value book in hard-currency EM sovereign, quasi-sovereign and corporate credit. It uses repo leverage and CDS, and the trades include sovereign vs. sovereign, curve, cash-CDS basis and capital-structure pairs [DDQ §2.1.1; Deck-Dec25 p.11]. The manager is Waha Investment, a wholly owned subsidiary of ADX-listed Waha Capital PJSC [PPM §1]. The fund reported $1,215m NAV at Dec 2025 and $1,392m "AUM" at Jan 2026 [FS-Dec25; FS-Jan26], within a firm with $2.8bn in assets [Deck-Dec25 p.3].
Why it may be worth a meeting.
- Long record with results that held up in hard years. Net returns run from Jan 2012 to Jan 2026: +317.5% cumulative and 10.7% annualized [FS-Jan26]. My recomputation from the monthly table gives 10.6% (calc). Only one calendar year was negative (2014, −0.4%). The fund was positive in the years the reference index fell: 2013 (+4.9% vs −5.25%), 2018 (+3.8% vs −4.3%) and 2022 (+1.8% vs −17.8% for the EMBI) [FS-Dec25].
- Low reported correlation: 0.3 to the EMB ETF and 0.2 to the S&P 500 over five years [FS-Jan26].
- Institutional service providers: BNP Paribas administration, HSBC custody, EY (now apparently PwC) audit, two independent Waystone directors, and five OTC bank counterparties [DDQ §3].
- Three of the investment team have worked together since 2010–2012 [Deck-Dec25 pp.14–15].
What is unclear, and the biggest gaps:
- The headline risk statistics cannot be reproduced. Factsheets quote volatility of 4.4% and a Sharpe ratio of 2.1–2.2 "since 2015". The published monthly returns since 2015 give 7.5% annualized volatility and a −16.1% maximum drawdown (calc). I could only get close to 4.4% by excluding March to May 2020 (4.5% (calc)). The footnote changed from "last three years" to "since 2015" in Dec 2022, and volatility fell from 8.8% to 4.6% in that one issue [FS-Sep22; FS-Dec22]. See §4.
- The 2012–2014 record predates the fund vehicle. The SPC was incorporated on 30 Oct 2014 [PPM §1]. The custodian was appointed in Feb 2015 [DDQ §3.6.1]. An affiliate seeded the fund with an in-kind portfolio transfer [Supp §5]. The 2012 return (+27.9%) and the 2013–14 drawdowns therefore appear to come from a Waha Capital book, not the fund. The fee basis and administrator for that period are not stated.
- Mandate drift and repositioning. The universe widened from CEEMEA to all EM, with a name change in May 2023 [FS-Dec25 note 4]. By Jan 2026 the strategy text says "credit and macro opportunities … relative and directional" [FS-Jan26], against the DDQ's "does not take a view on underlying interest rates or any currency" [DDQ §2.1.1]. Since Q2 2025 the book has been net short credit DV01, about −0.6m per bp [FS-Jun25 to FS-Jan26].
- Changes in the operating entity and service providers that need to be reconciled. The Investment Manager is "Waha Investment PJSC, regulated by SCA" in the [PPM] and "Waha Investments Ltd, regulated by the ADGM FSRA" in [FS-Jan26], with a new address. The auditor reads EY through Nov 2025 and PwC from Dec 2025. The custodian entity differs between [DDQ] (HSBC Bank plc, London) and [PPM] (HSBC Bank Middle East, Bahrain Branch, partly via the affiliate WCI).
- Concentrated, related-party investor base. The parent's seed is 36% of NAV and the top 10 investors hold 80% [DDQ §4.5.2–4.5.3]. The fund is about half of firm AUM.
2. Team
| Person | Role | Joined | Prior | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mohamed El Jamal | CIO; "ultimately responsible for all investment decisions" | 2010 | SocGen CIB London (debt/equity financing, advisory/lending); KPMG Corporate Finance Paris | Deck-Dec25 p.14; PPM §4 |
| Amit Davda | Co-PM, EM Credit | 2012 | EM trader at Deutsche Bank London; EM structured credit at WestLB; Goldman Sachs analyst | Deck-Dec25 p.14 |
| Umar Khan | Executive Director, EM Credit; helped set up the strategy | 2011 | Legion Partners (US small-cap activist) | Deck-Dec25 p.15 |
| Alae Chouaibi | Lead PM, Islamic Income | 2020 | Head of Investments, Al Hilal Bank; Citi, Deutsche, StanChart | Deck-Dec25 p.15 |
| Josefina Rodriguez Duran | Research, EM Credit | 2023 | Morgan Stanley IM, ING, BofAML EM corporate research | Deck-Dec25 p.16 |
| Sean Crawford | Analyst, EM Credit | 2021 | 4 years' experience; R/SQL/Python | Deck-Dec25 p.16 |
| Abdelilah El Hadfaoui | SVP, Portfolio & Risk Management; heads risk | 2022 | Invest AD quant risk; Ossiam/Natixis, GS | Deck-Dec25 p.17; DDQ §2.4.1 |
| George Mullan | Head of Finance & Operations; fund director; bank signatory | 2011 | SHRM Luxembourg; KPMG | Deck-Dec25 p.17; DDQ §4.4.1, §5.4 |
Facts.
- The DDQ describes "7 senior professionals" with an average of 15 years' experience and "no turnover in the team since inception" [DDQ §2.5.1]. The deck names six investment staff. One of them is the lead PM of a different product (Islamic Income) and one is a four-year analyst [Deck-Dec25 pp.14–16].
- The PPM names only El Jamal as Key Personnel and credits him with "the Fund's track record since inception" [PPM §4]. I found no key-person clause in the PPM or Supplement.
- Every signed factsheet commentary from Mar 2020 to Dec 2025 is signed by El Jamal.
Interpretation.
- The process appears to centre on the CIO. Davda is the only listed member with a sell-side EM trading background. Davda's and Khan's decision rights relative to El Jamal are not disclosed.
- "No turnover since inception" is a manager claim. The sources show hires in 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023, but no leaver history either way, so the claim cannot be verified here.
- The same team appears to cover other Waha segregated portfolios: Global Opportunity, Islamic Income, MENA Equity and EM Equity [PPM §4]. The time split and any shared positions are not disclosed.
- The risk head joined in 2022. Who held the role before, and whom the risk head reports to, are not stated.
3. Terms, Liquidity and Alignment
| Term | Class A | Class B | Class E | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Management fee | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.0% | Supp §8 |
| Performance fee | 15%, annual, HWM, no hurdle | same | same | Supp §8; DDQ §4.1.2 |
| Minimum / subsequent | $5m / $1m | $1m / $1m (DDQ says $100k) | $100k / $100k | Supp §5; DDQ §4.2.2–4.2.3 |
| Subscription fee | none | up to 2% (DDQ says none is permitted) | none | Supp §5; DDQ §4.1.7 |
| Distributions | accumulating | accumulating | annual dividend expected | Supp §6 |
- Liquidity: subscriptions weekly; redemptions monthly on 60 business days' notice (about three calendar months); no lock-up; proceeds within 5 business days [Supp §6; DDQ §4.3].
- Gate: 10% of fund NAV per Redemption Day. The excess is not carried forward, so investors must resubmit [Supp §6]. Suspension powers are broad, including "in the interests of the Shareholders" [DDQ §4.3.5]. No gate or suspension has ever been applied [DDQ §4.3.6, §4.3.13].
- Liquidity match: the manager estimates the book can be liquidated in about 1 month normally and 2–2.5 months in stress, with 5–10% of NAV held as unencumbered cash [DDQ §2.4.5–2.4.6, §3.1.2]. The 60-day notice roughly matches the stressed estimate.
- Side letters and fee discretion: side letters may grant better fees, liquidity and information. The Board need not disclose them or offer them to others [PPM §6]. The Investment Manager may "reduce, waive, calculate differently or rebate" fees at its absolute discretion [Supp §8]. This sits awkwardly with the DDQ statement that all investors pay fees in direct proportion to their holdings [DDQ §4.1.6]. No MFN provision was found.
- Governance: the Investment Manager holds 100% of the voting Management Shares [DDQ §1.4]. The Board has two independent Waystone directors (since Dec 2023) and George Mullan, the manager's Head of Finance & Ops, who is also an authorised bank signatory [DDQ §4.4.1, §5.4]. The board meets quarterly [DDQ §4.4.2].
Alignment.
- Parent seed. Waha Capital's seed is 36% of NAV with no preferential terms [DDQ §1.3, §4.5.2]. This is the largest single investor. "Partners/Employees of the Investment Manager" are listed at 37% of NAV [DDQ §4.5.1]. The two figures imply that the 37% is almost entirely the parent, so individual team co-investment is not quantified.
- Deferred pay. The LTIP awards vest over three years, and unvested amounts are reinvested in a synthetic NAV that tracks the fund [DDQ §2.5.1]. Plan size and participation are not disclosed.
- Fee economics (calc). On about $1.2–1.4bn, the 1.5% management fee is roughly $18–21m a year before any performance fee. With no hurdle, carry on spread income (long book yield 7.0% vs short 5.6% [FS-Dec25]) is fully fee-bearing.
- Interpretation. Parent capital and deferred pay support alignment. The parent's dominance (36% seed, 80% of NAV in the top 10) creates concentration risk: one redemption decision at Waha Capital would be large relative to the gate. Waha Capital also controls the manager's board and the voting shares.
4. Performance and Drawdowns
Reported (net, Class A) [FS-Jan26; FS-Dec25]:
| Year | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fund | 27.9% | 4.9% | −0.4% | 7.0% | 15.9% | 11.6% | 3.8% | 15.5% | 14.9% | 7.2% | 1.8% | 9.5% | 18.4% | 13.0% |
| Ref. index | 17.4% | −5.25% | 7.4% | 1.2% | 10.1% | 10.2% | −4.3% | 15.0% | 5.2% | −1.8% | −17.8% | 11.1% | 6.5% | 14.3% |
January 2026 was +2.4%. The reference index is "not to be used as a benchmark" [FS-Dec25 note 1]. It changed from JPM CEEMEA CEMBI (to 2022) to JPM EMBI (JPEIDIVR). Calendar-year figures are consistent across every factsheet vintage from 2020 to 2026, and my compounding of the monthly table matches each year within 0.4pp (calc). The DDQ states the NAV has never been restated [DDQ §4.6.3] and that reporting is GIPS compliant [DDQ §4.6.7].
Recomputed statistics (calc):
| Window | Ann. return | Ann. vol | Max DD | Positive months |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 2012 – Jan 2026 | 10.6% | 7.4% | −16.1% | 78% |
| Jan 2015 – Jan 2026 (the stated "since 2015" window) | 10.8% | 7.5% | −16.1% | 79% |
| Since 2015, excluding Mar–May 2020 | 11.1% | 4.5% | −6.7% | 79% |
| Jan 2021 – Jan 2026 | 10.2% | 4.7% | −6.7% | 79% |
| 2023 – 2025 | 13.5% | 3.8% | −1.5% | 86% |
Risk-statistic conflict (fact). Factsheets from Mar 2020 to Sep 2022 calculated risk statistics "for the last three years" and showed volatility of 6.1–8.8% and Sharpe ratios of 0.2–1.1. From Dec 2022 the footnote reads "since 2015", with volatility of 4.4–4.7% and Sharpe ratios of 1.8–2.2 [FS-Mar20 to FS-Jan26]. A since-2015 window includes March 2020 (−15.8%) and should give about 7.5% volatility (calc). The quoted 4.4% cannot be reproduced from the published monthly returns. This should be confirmed directly with the manager: whether 2020 is excluded, whether the figures come from weekly data, or whether this is an error. I am not concluding which.
Drawdowns (calc), peak to trough, from the monthly series:
| Episode | Depth | Recovery | Manager's explanation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 2013 (taper tantrum) | −5.8% | Feb 2014 | Pre-vehicle period; no commentary in sources |
| Jul 2014 – Jan 2015 (oil; Dec 2014 −6.0%) | −8.2% | Feb 2016, about 13 months after the trough | Pre-vehicle period; no commentary in sources |
| Jan – Mar 2020 (COVID) | −16.1% | Jun 2020 (3 months) | [FS-Mar20] below |
| Oct 2021 – Jun 2022 (rates/EM sell-off) | −6.7% | Nov 2022 | Defensive start (short DV01, light gross), then re-risked into the lows; covered shorts at 60–70c; bought Egypt at 55c [FS-Jun22] |
| Feb – Apr 2025 (tariff shock) | −1.5% | May 2025 | "Navigated the volatility … including the April tariff shock" [FS-Dec25] |
March 2020.
- Size of the loss. The fund lost −15.8% in the month while the long-only CEEMEA CEMBI reference fell −11.0% [FS-Mar20]. A hedged long/short book lost more than the unhedged index.
- Manager's explanation. The CIO cites three causes: grossing down early in thin markets to cover margin "even in an event that is twice as sharp as 2008" (cost about 200bp); building a cash buffer; and covering shorts below BGN marks. The CIO also says these covers locked in more than $40m of gains [FS-Mar20 p.2].
- Stated design targets. The same letter states a target of low-teens returns, a Sharpe ratio above 1.5 through the cycle, low single-digit drawdowns in 100–150bp widening events, and a drawdown in the low teens in a 2008-type event. The outcome was "at the wide end" of that.
- After the drawdown. The fund returned +9.8%, +7.5% and +4.5% from April to June and finished 2020 at +14.9%.
- Interpretation. The episode looks explainable, but it shows that funding and margin, not spread beta, drive the tail. The DDQ statement that in sudden illiquidity "longs would decrease in value, the shorts would increase" [DDQ §2.2.2] did not hold in March 2020. The CIO said structural, operational and risk parameters were reviewed afterwards, but the changes are not described.
Return profile change. Since 2023 returns are higher and volatility lower: 13.5% annualized at 3.8% volatility (calc). Over the same period AUM roughly doubled, the universe moved from CEEMEA to global EM, and the strategy language became more directional. With the sources available, I cannot say how much of 2023–25 came from relative value, carry, distressed or restructuring situations (Ukraine, Venezuela, Sri Lanka and Egypt all appear in the commentary) or net exposure. Annual attribution is the main gap.
5. Strategy and Edge
Manager's claim.
- Process. The CIO describes three pillars: a sovereign macro framework; bottom-up credit work on about 300 issuers, with field trips and management meetings; and a proprietary spread database used "subjectively" to flag cheap or rich relationships. A technical overlay covers primary calendars, ETF flows, index events and coupons [DDQ §2.1.3].
- Claimed edge. EM credit RV is a niche: most dedicated EM hedge funds (EMSO, Finisterre, Shiprock, Spinnaker) "do not offer a similar product", and similar trades usually sit inside macro funds [DDQ §2.5.1]. The edge is said to come from regional proximity and issuer access from Abu Dhabi.
What the evidence supports.
- Returns have been positive in most stress years and correlation to EM beta is low [FS-Dec25; FS-Jan26].
- Commentary shows trade-level RV thinking: Oman sukuk vs. conventional bonds and South Africa cash-CDS basis in 2020; Mashreq vs. CBD perps and UAE 30y vs. A-rated issuers in 2022; Saudi bank Tier 2 vs. HY sovereigns, Romania vs. Hungary, and Mexico vs. Guatemala/Dominican Republic in 2025 [FS-Mar20; FS-Jun22; FS-Dec25].
- The CEEMEA and GCC issuer base (Saudi, Kuwait, Oman, UAE) is where proximity is most plausible.
What doesn't fit the "pure RV, no directional view" framing.
- Portfolio shape (calc from factsheet stats). Longs are short-dated higher-spread credits (duration 4.6–4.7, Z-spread about 307–334). Shorts are long-dated lower-spread credits (duration 10.2, Z about 177–191). Yield to maturity is 7.0–7.4% on longs vs. 5.6% on shorts [FS-Dec25; FS-Jan26]. Net credit DV01 has been −0.61m per bp since Jun 2025, about −4% to −5% of NAV per 100bp of parallel spread move. Interpretation: the book is positioned for spread widening and IG long-end decompression while earning positive carry. That is a factor position, not neutral RV, and it can lose if HY longs gap down while the IG shorts don't move.
- Directional positions. The commentary describes directional, price-based positions: Egypt at 55c as a "high yield EM overweight" in 2022, a Venezuela position after Maduro's removal, and "trade with a short bias" in 2025 [FS-Jun22; FS-Dec25].
- Strategy wording. The Jan 2026 description adds "relative and directional opportunities" [FS-Jan26].
Still to diligence.
- How much P&L each trade type contributes (basis, curve, pairs, directional, distressed).
- Whether the database is used as a screen or as a signal.
- How the global expansion was staffed.
- Whether the edge scales from about $500m in 2021 to $1.4bn.
6. Portfolio, Risk and Capacity
- Breadth: 228 long and 150 short holdings (Jan 2026). Credit quality is 52% IG / 48% HY [FS-Jan26]. The DDQ says "100+ line items" and the deck says "over 300 positions" [DDQ §2.1.1; Deck-Dec25 p.8]. The counts are inconsistent but all show a diversified book.
- Regional net DV01 (Dec 2025): net short MENA & Turkey (−231k) and Others (−94k) and LatAm (+$64k) [FS-Dec25].
- Leverage: the PPM limit is 3.5x NAV [Supp §4], financed through committed facilities and evergreen long-dated repo with several counterparties [DDQ §2.1.1, §2.2.2]. The fund reported "balance sheet space equivalent to 1.5x NAV" in Jun 2022 [FS-Jun22]. My rough estimate of implied gross market value from DV01 and duration is about 2.6–3.3x NAV in 2021–2026, and about 4.3x in Mar 2020 (calc; approximate, as CDS and the duration conventions blur it). Actual gross, net and repo leverage history is not disclosed and is a primary gap.
- Risk framework: issuer and ISIN limits, jurisdiction and credit-quality diversification, portfolio stop-loss, a maximum leverage limit, VaR limits, and stress tests based on historical credit events [DDQ §2.4.3]. Stress tests are weekly [Deck-Dec25 p.20]. No limit values are disclosed. The risk team is described as independent, but its reporting line is not stated.
- Hedging: rates hedged with futures; EUR and GBP hedged to USD daily [DDQ §2.4.3, §3.1.1].
- Valuation: 99.5% Level 1 and 0.5% Level 2 per the FY2024 audited statements [DDQ §3.2.5]. Pricing is mostly observable.
- Capacity: not disclosed. NAV has grown from $312m (Mar 2020) to $524m (Dec 2021), $669m (Dec 2023), $1,039m (Dec 2024), $1,319m (Nov 2025), $1,215m (Dec 2025) and $1,392m (Jan 2026) [FS series].
- AUM swings at year end (calc). NAV fell about $104m in Dec 2025 despite a +1.2% return, implying net outflows of about $120m. It then rose $177m in Jan 2026 on a +2.4% return, implying inflows of about $145m. The Jan 2026 label also changed from "NAV" to "AUM", so the two figures may not be on the same basis.
7. Key Counterparties and ODD Snapshot
| Function | Provider | Notes / conflicts | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Investment Manager | Waha Investment PJSC (SCA-regulated) → Waha Investments Ltd (ADGM FSRA) | New entity, regulator and address by Jan 2026; whether the IMA was novated is not shown | PPM §1; FS-Jan26 |
| Administrator | BNP Paribas Fund Administration Services (Ireland), since 1 Oct 2024 | Weekly NAV; SOC 1 Type II by Deloitte Ireland. HSBC was "Custodian/Admin" earlier. DDQ also says daily reconciliation is done with "the Apex Group" (unexplained) | DDQ §3.4, §3.2.7; FS-Mar20 |
| Custodian | HSBC | DDQ: HSBC Bank plc London, appointed 1 Feb 2015. PPM/deck: HSBC Bank Middle East, Bahrain Branch, engaged by WCI (Waha Capital Investments LLC, an affiliate that executes "certain investments") | DDQ §3.6; PPM §3; Deck-Dec25 p.19 |
| Auditor | Ernst & Young (Cayman engagement, Abu Dhabi team) since 31 Mar 2019, replacing Deloitte under UAE rotation rules | Factsheets show PwC from Dec 2025. No qualified opinions reported | DDQ §3.3; FS-Dec25 |
| OTC / financing | J.P. Morgan, BofA, Goldman Sachs, Citi, Nomura (ISDA) | No prime broker named; repo counterparties and facility terms not disclosed | DDQ §3.5 |
| Legal | Clifford Chance (Singapore), King & Spalding (Dubai, from Q1 2021), Walkers (Cayman) | DDQ §3.3.4 | |
| Directors | Lynden John and Sophia Dilbert (Waystone, from 22 Dec 2023); George Mullan (from Jun 2019) | Who served before Dec 2023 is not stated | DDQ §4.4.1 |
| Fund regulator | CIMA | Deck-Dec25 p.19 |
ODD-relevant facts (no judgment).
- The manager approves the administrator's NAV after its own reconciliation and has "not disputed" any valuation [DDQ §3.2.6–3.2.7].
- Three manager employees are bank signatories: Mullan, Agarwal and El Hadfaoui [DDQ §5.4].
- The PPM permits soft dollars [PPM §12].
- The manager runs other funds and proprietary accounts for affiliates. Allocation is "in general" pro rata, but not necessarily pari passu [PPM §12].
- Document hygiene: the DDQ file name and cover disagree on the quarter, and the DDQ and deck disclaimers refer to "mutual funds".
8. Known / Unknown / Ask Next
| Area | What we know | What we don't know | Ask next |
|---|---|---|---|
| Team | CIO since 2010; co-PM and ED since 2011–12; six named investment staff, one of them on Islamic Income; risk head since 2022 | Decision rights between El Jamal and Davda; leaver history; shared coverage with other Waha funds; whether there is a key-person clause | Org chart, decision process, leaver list since 2015, time allocation across funds, succession plan |
| Terms / liquidity | 1.5/15 with HWM and no hurdle; monthly on 60 business days' notice; 10% gate, not carried forward; no lock-up | Side letters in place; any MFN; Class B/E holders; DDQ vs. Supplement conflicts on the B minimum and subscription fee | Side-letter schedule, fee-rebate list, reconciled terms sheet |
| Performance | 14 years of monthly net returns; positive in 2013, 2018 and 2022; −16.1% in 2020 (calc) | Basis of the 4.4% volatility and 2.1 Sharpe; whether 2012–14 was a proprietary book and on what fee basis; Feb–Oct 2026 | Admin-signed NAV history from 2015; audited financials FY2015–25; risk-stat method; 2012–14 composite description; 2026 YTD |
| Strategy / edge | Three-pillar RV process; trade examples in commentary; CEEMEA expanded to global EM in May 2023 | P&L by trade type and region; share of directional and distressed P&L; why the strategy wording changed in Jan 2026 | Annual attribution 2015–25; top 10 winners and losers per year; current book by trade type |
| Risk / exposures | DV01 long/short and regional splits monthly; 3.5x leverage limit; net short about −$0.6m/bp since mid-2025 | Gross, net and repo leverage history; limit values; stop-loss level; stress results; margin terms | Monthly exposure and leverage history; risk limit schedule; latest risk report; repo and facility terms |
| Capacity | NAV grew about 4.5x since 2020; about half of firm AUM | Manager's capacity estimate; the Dec 2025 outflow and Jan 2026 inflow | Capacity view and method; flow history by investor type; pipeline |
| ODD / counterparties | BNP, HSBC, EY/PwC, five ISDA banks, Waystone directors | Manager entity change to ADGM; auditor switch; which HSBC entity holds the assets; Apex's role; WCI's role | Regulatory licences, IMA novation, FY2025 audit sign-off, custody agreements, SOC 1 report |
| Alignment | Parent seed 36%; LTIP deferred into a synthetic NAV | Personal GP/team capital; LTIP size; parent's redemption intentions | Dollar team co-investment by date; LTIP terms; seed lock or redemption policy |
9. Diligence Questions
Incentive alignment
- Excluding Waha Capital's seed, how much do El Jamal, Davda, Khan and the wider team have in the fund personally, and how has that changed since 2020?
- Does Waha Capital have any lock-up, notice or redemption-intention arrangement on its 36% stake? What would trigger it to reduce?
- How many investors have side letters, and on what (fees, liquidity, information)? Is there an MFN?
- Why is there no hurdle on a strategy that earns positive carry?
Edge and repeatability 5. Break down 2015–2025 P&L by trade type (basis, curve, pairs, capital structure, directional, distressed) and by region. 6. How much of 2023–2025's 13.5% annualized came from the expansion beyond CEEMEA, and who covers LatAm and Asia? 7. The Jan 2026 factsheet says "relative and directional opportunities." What changed, and what is the cap on net credit DV01? 8. How is the proprietary spread database used? Does it trigger trades or only rank candidates?
Performance and drawdowns 9. How exactly are the 4.4% volatility and 2.1 Sharpe "since 2015" computed? Do they exclude 2020, and why did the window change in Dec 2022? 10. What was the 2012–2014 vehicle, which fees applied, and was it administered or audited? 11. Which specific changes to risk, financing or margin were made after March 2020, and what would the same shock cost the fund today? 12. What explains the −8.2% from Jul 2014 to Jan 2015 and its roughly 13-month recovery?
Team stability 13. Who has final say on sizing when El Jamal and Davda disagree? What happens if El Jamal leaves? 14. How much of the team's time goes to the Global Opportunity and Islamic Income funds, and do those funds hold the same positions? 15. Has anyone in the investment or risk team left since 2015?
Risk, financing and capacity 16. What have gross, net and repo leverage been monthly since 2019? What is the current haircut and margin regime with each repo counterparty? 17. What are the VaR, stop-loss and per-issuer limits, and have any been breached? 18. At what AUM would the strategy's returns degrade? Is a soft close planned? 19. What drove the roughly $120m net outflow in Dec 2025 and the inflow in Jan 2026?
Entity and service providers 20. Has the Investment Manager moved from Waha Investment PJSC (SCA) to Waha Investments Ltd (ADGM)? Was the IMA novated, and has the PPM been updated? 21. Who audited FY2025, and why did the auditor change? 22. Which HSBC entity holds the fund's assets? What does WCI execute, and what is Apex Group's role?
10. Reference Check Prep
Current investors. How did the manager communicate in March 2020 and 2022? Were the risk statistics in marketing ever discussed? Any surprises on the gate, the ADGM move or the auditor change?
Former investors. Why did you redeem (including any year-end 2025 redeemers)? Did liquidity terms work as described? Were side letters an issue?
Former employees. Is the process El Jamal's or the team's? How independent is risk from the CIO and from Waha Capital? How are allocations handled across Waha funds and the parent's own book?
Service providers (BNP, HSBC, EY/PwC). How long have you worked with the fund? Any valuation challenges or reconciliation breaks? Why did the administrator change in 2024? What is Apex's role?
11. Suggested Materials Request List
- Monthly net NAV history from 2015 to date, administrator-signed, plus a description of the 2012–14 track record (vehicle, fees, administrator)
- Audited financial statements FY2015–FY2025, including the FY2025 auditor's report
- Annual P&L attribution by trade type, region and directional vs. RV, 2015–2025
- Monthly gross, net and repo leverage history and margin usage, including Q1 2020
- Risk limit schedule (VaR, stop-loss, issuer/ISIN, leverage) and a recent risk report
- Repo and committed facility terms by counterparty (tenor, haircuts, termination rights)
- Current portfolio summary by trade type and top-20 positions
- Updated PPM and supplement reflecting the Investment Manager entity, regulator and auditor; IMA and novation documents
- ADGM FSRA and SCA licence details; compliance manual summary
- Side-letter schedule and fee-rebate policy; MFN status
- AUM and flow history by investor type; seed investor terms
- Org chart, bios for the full investment and risk team, leaver history, LTIP terms
- Valuation policy (Oct 2024) and the BNP SOC 1 report
- Methodology note for the factsheet risk statistics
- Reference list (current and former investors, former employees, service providers)
12. Sources Reviewed
All in Fund/Waha_EM_Credit/sources/:
- Waha Emerging Markets Credit Fund DDQ: file named "Q4 2025", cover "Q3 2025", investor data as of 31 Aug 2025 (27 pp.)
- Waha Emerging Markets Credit Fund investor presentation, Dec 2025 (2025 return marked "estimate") and Sep 2025 (data to 31 Aug 2025)
- Waha Investment Management Company SPC Private Placement Memorandum, Oct 2024 (116 pp.)
- Waha Emerging Markets Credit Fund SP Supplement, Oct 2024
- Waha Emerging Markets Credit Fund SP Non-US Subscription Form (refers to the Oct 2024 PPM)
- Monthly factsheets (25): Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec 2020; Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec 2021; May, Jun, Sep, Dec 2022; Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec 2023; Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec 2024; Mar, Jun, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec 2025; Jan 2026
Not available in the reviewed materials: audited financials, attribution, exposure and leverage history, risk reports, standalone investor letters (beyond factsheet commentary), regulatory filings or licences, ODD reports, reference lists, and anything after January 2026. No outside (web) sources were used.
