Peer Duel, Compound With AI

Adyen vs American Express: who wins the next decade?

Payments. ADYEN (Euronext Amsterdam) / AXP (NYSE). Run 17 September 2026. Built from Adyen annual reports FY2023-25, shareholder letters H2 2024 to H1 2026, Investor Day 2025 and M&A call transcripts; American Express 10-Ks FY2021-25, Q2 2026 10-Q and 2026 earnings-call transcripts; plus cited web sources for the event sweep. Events swept through 17 September 2026; most recent events checked: Amex CFO comments at an investor conference (16 Sep 2026) and Adyen CFO Ethan Tandowsky's exit effective 31 Aug 2026. Adyen figures in EUR, Amex in USD; the duel compares ratios and growth rates, not absolutes (size gap at ~1.13 USD/EUR, approx., unverified: Adyen net revenue ~$2.7bn vs Amex $72.2bn, roughly 27x). Not a valuation and not a recommendation.

AdyenAmerican Express

Pairing note: these two sit at opposite ends of the same card transaction. Adyen is a merchant-side processor and acquirer earning a take rate; Amex is a closed-loop issuer, network and acquirer earning merchant discount, card fees and interest. They compete for the same pool (what merchants pay to accept a payment), so the duel asks which economic position compounds better, not who has more share of one product.

The Call
Adyen is the stronger business for the next 5-10 years: American Express owns the deeper moat, but it pays for its growth with rewards, credit and partner payments, while Adyen compounds share of wallet on a capital-light stack.
The load-bearing fact: Amex hands back 49.6% of revenue in rewards, card benefits, partner payments and credit losses (3-year average) to grow about 10%; Adyen keeps 88% of revenue after pass-through costs and grew net revenue 21% a year, 2022-25 (Adyen AR FY2023-25; Amex 10-K FY2025).
1
Runway: Adyen's typical merchant goes from under 20% share of wallet in years 3-7 to over 40% after year 12, and it holds about 5% of its market opportunity (H1 2026 letter; Investor Day 2025 transcript). Amex's premium base is deep but already mature in the US.
2
Conversion: Adyen EBITDA margin on net revenue rose 45.7% to 52.7% in 2023-25 with a 2028 target above 55%; Amex's variable customer engagement costs rose from 41.3% to 42.8% of revenue while pretax margin stayed near 19% (AR FY2025; 10-K FY2025).
3
Risk shape: Adyen carries no consumer credit and no deposit funding; in 2020 its net revenue grew 28% while Amex revenue fell 17% (Adyen H2 2020 letter; Amex 10-K FY2021).
Growth profile
Adyen - clear
Margin conversion
Adyen - clear
Resilience
Adyen breaks last - narrow
The three answers, argued below. Left lean favors Adyen, right lean favors American Express; marker position shows how decisive.

The Three Answers

1. Who has the stronger growth profile, by product x geography?
Adyen, clear

Three Adyen cells carry the next five years. North American enterprise acceptance (+30% cc in H1 2026, 27% of net revenue) grows by moving large US merchants and platforms such as Toast and OpenAI onto a stack they have not used before, so growth is share gain rather than market growth. Unified Commerce (+27% cc, 32% of net revenue) grows because the same identity and settlement stack runs online and in-store: 838K transacting terminals (+27%) and 486 merchants at scale on both channels, now with Talon.One loyalty bolted on. Platforms (+40% cc) adds issuing, capital and accounts to vertical SaaS, a second revenue layer on volume Adyen already processes (H1 2026 letter). Amex's forward engine is the premium membership refresh cycle, which works (Platinum is its fastest-growing US consumer portfolio, Q2 2026 call), but each cycle costs more in benefits and lifts a mature base by high single digits; the 2026 guide is about 10% revenue growth.

1001251501752022202320242025Adyen 178Amex 137
Revenue indexed to 100 in 2022. Adyen net revenue EUR 1,330m (2022, sum of regions in H2 2022 letter), 1,626m, 1,996m, 2,364m (AR FY2024, FY2025). Amex revenues net of interest expense $52,862m, $60,515m, $65,949m, $72,229m (10-K FY2023, FY2025). H1 2026: Adyen +19% reported, Amex +11%.
2. Who converts that growth into superior margins?
Adyen, clear

Adyen converts through operating leverage on one platform: interchange and scheme fees are passed through, so 88% of mapped revenue is gross profit, and the heavier line (people, 44% of revenue) is falling as a share because the same code serves every region; SG&A-equivalent went from 46.1% to 41.9% of revenue in two years. Amex converts through pricing power on card fees ($92 to $117 average fee per card, 2023-25, $131 in Q2 2026) but recycles it: rewards, card-member services and partner payments grew faster than revenue in 2025, and the company chose to reinvest its 2026 revenue beat rather than raise EPS guidance (Q2 2026 call). The tension worth noting is that Amex wins the power lens yet loses the margin lens: its moat is real, but it is paid for every year.

Gross margin0%100%Adyen 88.1%Amex 50.4%+37.7ptsEBIT margin0%100%Adyen 38.7%Amex 18.7%+20.0pts
3-year averages FY2023-25 on a mapped basis (see Cost Engine tab). Gross margin: Adyen revenue less costs from financial institutions, terminal COGS and interest expense; Amex revenue less provisions, rewards, card-member services and business development. EBIT: Adyen income before net finance income; Amex pretax income. Adyen AR FY2024-25; Amex 10-K FY2025.
3. Where do the vulnerabilities sit if the tide turns?
American Express breaks first in a downturn Adyen breaks first in a price war

Amex's exposure is the balance sheet behind the spend: $151.8bn of card-member loans funded largely by $152.5bn of deposits, provisions already 7-8% of revenue, and discount revenue (52% of revenue) tied to consumer spending; in 2020 revenue fell 17% (10-K FY2025, FY2021). Adyen's exposure is price: tiered pricing hands take rate back as merchants scale (Platforms take rate about 12bps vs 17bps in Unified Commerce, H1 2026, inferred from letter volumes and revenue), and a few hundred enterprise merchants drive about 60% of growth, so a Stripe-led price war on the largest accounts would show up as growth and take rate falling together. In a cyclical downturn Amex breaks first because credit losses and spend fall at once; in a structural disruption (merchants steering shoppers to cheaper methods, surcharging) Amex is also more exposed, and Adyen is building the steering tool (Personalize, H2 2025 letter).

Segment-Geography Scorecard

These five cells carry roughly 80% of the combined economics of both firms; every score is argued in the tabs below.

Cell (product x region)AdyenAmexWhy (one clause, sourced)
US consumer premium spend05Adyen has no consumer product; Amex USCS is 48% of revenue, fees +20% and Platinum its fastest grower (10-K FY2025; Q2 2026 call).
Enterprise merchant acceptance, EMEA52Adyen EMEA 58% of net revenue, +22% a year 2023-25 on own EU license; Amex exited its EU network business under fee-cap regulation (AR FY2025; 10-Q Q2 2026).
Merchant acceptance, North America43Adyen NA +30% cc in H1 2026 from share gains; Amex network volumes +7% but discount rate slipping 2.29% to 2.24% and surcharging rising (letter H1 2026; 10-K FY2025).
Commercial and platform payments, US-led43Adyen Platforms +40% cc, issuing volume 8x in 2025 from a small base; Amex CS billed business +3%, revenue +7% (letters H2 2025, H1 2026; 10-K FY2025).
International cards and acceptance, APAC, LatAm, Canada, Japan34Adyen APAC +14% and LatAm +12% a year 2023-25, below group; Amex ICS billed business +14% and pretax income +55% in 2025 (AR FY2025; 10-K FY2025).
How to read the scores: 5 dominant in the cell and compounding (share + price + growth) 4 advantaged and gaining share 3 holds position; grows with the market 2 subscale or stagnant; holds only by discounting or legacy 1 weak and losing share, or exiting 0 no meaningful presence

Scores are anchored to the exhibits in the three tabs. Scores are per cell and are not summed; the three lenses get their verdicts in the Three Answers above.

Adyen runs one engine (merchant fees) across three fast cells; Amex runs four engines (discount revenue, card fees, interest, service fees) that each grow near 10%.

The filings do not line up, so the map is normalized. Adyen reports pillars (Digital, Unified Commerce, Platforms) and regions (EMEA, North America, APAC, LatAm) separately, with no pillar x region matrix, so pillar-region cells are ND and the two dimensions are shown side by side. Adyen's regions follow merchant billing location, and North America includes APAC-headquartered merchants billed there (H2 2025 letter). Amex segments are already product x geography: US Consumer (USCS), Commercial (CS, US), International Card Services (ICS, all cards outside the US including Canada) and Global Merchant and Network Services (GMNS).

The contrast is stark. Adyen's two newer cells are 44% of net revenue and grew 30% and 50% in 2025; its largest cell, Digital, grew 9% reported, held back by one large customer moving volume away (volume +8% in 2025, +21% excluding that customer, H2 2025 letter). Amex's largest cell, US Consumer, is also its best: 11% a year 2023-25 with rising card fees. Its merchant and network cell is the laggard at 4%, which matters because merchant economics are exactly where Adyen operates.

Adyen (% of net revenue, FY25)American Express (% of revenue, FY25)Engine 1 (largest)Digital 56.5% | +9%US Consumer 48.0% | +11%Engine 2Unified Commerce 32.4% | +30%Commercial (US) 23.3% | +7%Engine 3Platforms 11.2% | +50%International Cards 17.9% | +13%Engine 4no fourth engineMerchant and Network 10.7% | +4%Home regionEMEA 57.6% | +19%United States 78.0% | NDOutside home regionNA, APAC, LatAm 42.4% | +18%Outside US 22.0% | ND
Each company's reported cells ranked by share of revenue (FY2025), mirrored on a shared percentage scale. Growth is FY2025 year on year, reported currency. Amex segment shares use segment revenue before eliminations ($72,499m). Amex US share is derived from "approximately 22 percent ... outside the United States" (10-K FY2025 risk factors); regional growth ND. Adyen AR FY2025 note 2.2; Amex 10-K FY2025 segment tables.

The cells that matter

CellAdyen FY25 (% of NR)GrowthAmex FY25 (% of rev)Growth, 2y CAGRMargin signal / leader
Engine 1: Digital / US ConsumerEUR 1,335m (56%)+9% (+15% cc H1'26)$34,814m (48%)+11%Adyen Digital take rate 16.8bps (inferred); Amex USCS pretax margin 19.6%. Amex leads on pricing, Adyen on growth.
Engine 2: Unified Commerce / CommercialEUR 765m (32%)+30% (+27% cc)$16,926m (23%)+7%Adyen UC 17.3bps, highest pillar take rate (inferred); Amex CS pretax 21.7%. Adyen leads.
Engine 3: Platforms / International CardsEUR 264m (11%)+50% (+40% cc)$13,000m (18%)+12%Adyen Platforms 12.3bps, tiering visible (inferred); Amex ICS pretax 12.3%, lowest segment margin. Split.
Engine 4: none / Merchant and NetworkNDND$7,759m (11%)+2%Amex GMNS pretax 51% on allocated segment revenue; discount rate 2.29% to 2.24%, 2023-25.
Geography: home / outsideEMEA 58% / 42%+19% / +18%US ~78% / ~22%ND / ICS +13%Adyen is the more global business; Amex is a US franchise with a growing international card book.
Insight: Adyen's growth sits in cells that are still small and compounding at 27-40% cc; Amex's largest cell is also its best, but its merchant cell grows 4%. Implication: Adyen's mix shifts toward faster cells each year, while Amex's merchant-side economics, the pool the two share, grow slowest. KPI: Adyen Unified Commerce plus Platforms above 47% of net revenue in FY2027 (44% in FY2025); Amex GMNS revenue growth above 5%. [Source: Adyen AR FY2025 note 2.2, H1 2026 letter; Amex 10-K FY2025 segment tables]

Segment growth engines

Adyen, share of wallet. About two thirds of H1 2026 growth came from customers onboarded in 2024 and earlier; the rest from the 2025 cohort, new wins and financial products, net of volume tiering (H1 2026 letter). Management's Investor Day framing is that newer cohorts contribute 2-3x more growth in year two than in year one (Investor Day 2025 transcript). Acquired growth is now in the mix: Talon.One (EUR 750m, about EUR 60m ARR growing 30-40%) and Orb ($335m) closed on 1 July 2026 and add about 1 point to 2026 growth and 1-2 points to 2027 (M&A call 23 Apr 2026; H1 2026 letter).

Amex, membership refresh. Net card fees grew 18% in 2025 and 17% in H1 2026 on new premium acquisition, retention and product refreshes; proprietary new cards acquired fell from 13.0m (2024) to 12.5m (2025), so the lift is price and mix more than volume (10-K FY2025; 10-Q Q2 2026). ICS growth in 2026 is partly inorganic: Swisscard became wholly owned on 12 January 2026 (10-Q Q2 2026).

Insight: Adyen grows by deepening existing merchants, now with bought loyalty and billing; Amex grows by repricing premium cards more than by adding them. Implication: Adyen's driver compounds with its base; Amex's driver needs a new refresh every few years to keep fees rising. KPI: Adyen share of growth from 2024-and-earlier cohorts stays near two thirds; Amex proprietary new cards acquired back above 13m a year. [Source: H1 2026 letter; 10-K FY2025 Table 5]

Price control and route-to-market

Adyen sells direct to enterprises and through platforms, prices interchange-plus with volume tiers, and passes scheme and interchange costs through, so it controls its margin but not its take rate: take rate moved 16.2bps (H2 2024), 17.1bps (H2 2025), 16.2bps (H1 2026) on mix and tiering (letters). Amex sets both prices in a closed loop, card fees to consumers and merchant discount to merchants, but the merchant side is being contested: discount revenue as a share of billed business slipped from 2.29% to 2.24% over 2023-25 and 2.23% in H1 2026, merchant surcharging is rising where allowed, and Australia's central bank ends the requirement to permit surcharging on 1 October 2026 and opened a review of three-party networks in June 2026 (10-K FY2025; 10-Q Q2 2026).

Insight: Amex controls both prices but its merchant price is eroding; Adyen controls neither interchange nor tiers but passes the first through and chooses the second. Implication: Merchant-side pricing power is migrating away from premium networks toward whoever controls checkout routing, which favors Adyen. KPI: Amex discount revenue as % of billed business at or above 2.20% through FY2027; Adyen take rate at or above 15.5bps. [Source: 10-K FY2025 Table 5; 10-Q Q2 2026; Adyen letters H2 2024-H1 2026]

Supply resilience

InputAdyenAmerican Express
Card network accessDepends on Visa and Mastercard scheme licenses and rules (AR FY2025 risk section)Owns its network; exited EU and Australia network licensing under regulation
Funding / licensesOwn banking licenses in EU, US, UK; net cash EUR 4.9bn excluding merchant balances (H1 2026)Customer deposits $152.5bn fund $151.8bn of loans (10-K FY2025)
ComputeOwn data centers; capex pulled forward to 7% of net revenue in 2026 to lock in supplyNot a disclosed constraint
PartnersNo single customer disclosed as material; concentration "within risk appetite"Delta cobrand ~13% of billed business, ~21% of loans, contract to end-2029

Competitive context

Adyen's cells are contested by Stripe (payment volume +34% in 2025, approx., unverified), Checkout.com, JPMorgan and the legacy acquirers Fiserv and Worldpay/Global Payments, which are flat to shrinking (approx., unverified); Adyen is a share-taker. Amex's premium cells are contested by bank issuers on Visa and Mastercard rails, notably JPMorgan and Capital One (which now owns the Discover network); Amex holds share in premium and takes share internationally, with Millennials and Gen Z about 65% of new accounts (investor conference, 16 Sep 2026, via Yahoo Finance).

Risks by segment

Adyen Digital: large merchants renegotiating tiers while Stripe moves up-market would compress take rate faster than wallet share rises; this is where Adyen is more exposed. Amex US Consumer: each refresh adds fixed benefit costs (card-member services +27% in 2025, +49% in H1 2026) that must be covered by fee growth; if premium consumers trade down in a slowdown, costs stay and fees soften. Amex Merchant and Network: regulation of three-party pricing (Australia review, EU cobrand fee-cap case in the Netherlands after the April 2026 CJEU ruling) cuts discount rate directly; Adyen gains from the same shift.

Adyen has the higher-probability growth path: its fastest cells are already 44% of net revenue, its core grows by share of wallet in a fragmented market, and Amex's roughly 10% engine needs rising benefit spend to hold its pace.
Amex sets the terms with consumers; Adyen sets the terms with nobody, but it is also beholden to nobody for funding.
Moats
American Express - narrow
Customers
American Express - narrow
Suppliers
Adyen - clear
Who sets the terms, lever by lever; each call argued below.

Moats: what rivals cannot copy

Adyen

1) One global stack plus own banking licenses in the EU, US and UK; replicating licensed, single-code acquiring across regions takes years (Medium-High). 2) Cross-channel identity data: about 95% of roughly 400m Black Friday shoppers recognized in real time across online and in-store (H2 2025 letter) (Medium). 3) Peak reliability, 99.9999% uptime on 837m BFCM transactions (Medium). Stripe is building the same with money and time, so none is High.

American Express

1) Premium membership brand with proven pricing: 86.6m proprietary cards, average fee per card up 12-14% a year, $10.0bn of card fees in 2025 (High). 2) Closed-loop network seeing both sides of $1,897bn of network volume (High). 3) Rewards and cobrand ecosystem (Delta, Marriott, Hilton, Membership Rewards) (High, partner-dependent). Sources: 10-K FY2025.

Insight: Amex's advantages take decades and a brand to copy; Adyen's take years and engineering, and a funded rival is doing it. Implication: Amex's moat is more durable; Adyen must keep out-executing to keep its lead. KPI: Amex average fee per card growth above 10%; Adyen merchants at scale on both channels above 550 by H1 2027 (486 in H1 2026). [Source: 10-K FY2025; H1 2026 letter]

Customers: who controls net price and access

Adyen: enterprises multi-source by design, which is why share of wallet rises slowly from under 20% to over 40% over a decade; the same fact means merchants keep live alternatives and win lower tiers as they grow, so Adyen's pricing power is exercised on value-added products, not on core processing (H1 2026 letter; H1 2026 call). Amex: consumers pay rising annual fees without volume collapse (fees +18%, cards-in-force +4% in 2025), which is pricing power exercised; merchants, the other side, push back through surcharging and lower discount rates, and one partner (Delta) carries 21% of loans (10-K FY2025).

Insight: Amex exercises pricing power on consumers and loses it on merchants; Adyen concedes core price to its biggest merchants by design. Implication: When demand softens, Amex's margin pressure lands on merchant discount and credit; Adyen's lands on take rate. KPI: Amex card-fee growth vs discount-rate change each year; Adyen top-300 merchant share of growth below 60%. [Source: 10-K FY2025; 10-Q Q2 2026; H1 2026 letter]

Suppliers: who absorbs shocks

Adyen's critical suppliers are the card schemes, but their fees are passed through (costs from financial institutions 7.2% of IFRS revenue in 2025), and it funds itself from equity and float, holding EUR 4.9bn of own cash (AR FY2025; H1 2026 letter). Amex's critical inputs are funding and partners: interest expense and deposit pricing move with rates, and business development payments to partners reached $6.5bn in 2025, rising with volumes (10-K FY2025). In a rate or credit shock Amex absorbs it in provisions and funding cost; Adyen's finance income falls (EUR 268m in 2025 vs 350m in 2024) but operating margin is untouched.

Insight: Adyen passes supplier costs through and needs no external funding; Amex's inputs, deposits and partners, are rate- and contract-sensitive. Implication: In a shock Adyen keeps supplying at stable net price; Amex's economics move with credit and rates. KPI: Amex provisions for credit losses below 8% of revenue; Delta cobrand renewal announced before end-2029. [Source: AR FY2025; 10-K FY2025]

The price/power triangle: top 3 cells

CellRoute controlPocket priceContinuityOutcome (share / margin)Confirming KPI
Enterprise acceptance, North AmericaAdyen direct to merchant; Amex direct via GMNS and OptBlue acquirersAdyen below legacy acquirers on tiers; Amex above bankcard ratesBoth highAdyen share up, margin flat; Amex share flat, discount rate downAdyen NA cc growth at or above 25%; Amex discount rate at or above 2.20%
US consumer premium spendAmex direct to consumer; Adyen absentAmex fee per card risingAmex high, Delta to 2029Amex share up, margin flat (VCE absorbs fees)Amex VCE at or below 43% of revenue
Enterprise acceptance, EMEAAdyen direct, own license; Amex capped by EU rulesAdyen parity to below; Amex cappedAdyen high; Amex regulatory riskAdyen share up, margin up; Amex flatAdyen EMEA growth at or above 15%

The causal gap

1) Balance-sheet model (Major): Amex carries credit and funding risk as the price of issuing; Adyen carries neither. The gap is the business model, so neither side closes it. 2) Who pays for growth (Major): Amex spends about 43% of revenue on rewards, benefits and partner payments to grow near 10%; Adyen gives price back through tiers but keeps 88% after pass-through. Not closable without Amex weakening its value proposition. 3) Consumer pricing power (Moderate): Amex's is real and Adyen has none; Adyen's route to comparable lock-in is moving into loyalty and billing (Talon.One, Orb, Intelligent Money Movement), a 3-5 year project that money alone does not finish.

Amex holds the stronger moat and the only proven pricing power in this pair; Adyen holds the cleaner supplier and funding position. Early warnings: Adyen take rate under 15bps with growth under 18% cc; Amex discount rate under 2.18% or card-fee growth under 12%.
Adyen runs leaner at the gross line by 38 points and at the operating line by 20; the gap is made of rewards and credit, not efficiency.

The statements are not like-for-like and the mapping is stated once. Adyen presents costs by nature under IFRS: revenue = non-interest revenue plus interest income; COGS proxy = costs incurred from financial institutions + cost of goods sold (terminals) + interest expense, so gross profit equals Adyen's net revenue; SG&A = wages, social security and pension, and other operating expenses; D&A (4.6-5.1%) sits outside; EBIT = income before net finance income and taxes, which excludes EUR 268m of 2025 finance income. Amex presents by function as a bank: revenue = total revenues net of interest expense; COGS proxy = provisions for credit losses + card-member rewards + card-member services + business development; SG&A = marketing + salaries and benefits + other, net; EBIT proxy = pretax income. Neither company discloses R&D, so it is ND for both.

Three years, five ratios

% of mapped revenue, 3y avg FY2023-25AdyenAmerican ExpressGapWhat drives it
COGS proxy11.9%49.6%-37.7ptsAmex pays rewards, benefits, partners and credit losses; Adyen passes interchange through
R&DNDNDNDNot disclosed; technology sits in staff and other costs at both
SG&A44.3%31.7%+12.5ptsAdyen is people-centric (5,020 FTE); Amex spreads fixed cost over a far larger revenue base
Gross margin88.1%50.4%+37.7ptsPosition in the value chain
EBIT margin38.7%18.7%+20.0ptsGross gap only partly offset by Amex's lighter overhead
COGS proxy11.9%49.6%R&DND for bothSG&A44.3%31.7%Gross margin88.1%50.4%EBIT margin38.7%18.7%AdyenAmerican Express3-year average, FY2023-25, % of mapped revenue
Adyen AR FY2024 and FY2025 consolidated statements of comprehensive income; Amex 10-K FY2025 Tables 1, 3 and 4.
YearAdyen revenue (EURm)COGSSG&AGMEBITAmex revenue ($m)COGSSG&AGMEBIT
20231,86312.7%46.1%87.3%35.3%60,51549.4%33.2%50.6%17.4%
20242,25311.4%44.9%88.6%39.4%65,94949.2%31.2%50.8%19.6%
20252,67211.5%41.9%88.5%41.5%72,22950.1%30.8%49.9%19.1%

The structural gap

The persistent gap is gross margin: about 38 points in every year, explained by position rather than one-offs. Amex earns the full merchant discount and card fees but returns roughly half to cardmembers, partners and credit losses, and that share rose to 50.1% in 2025 as the Platinum refresh added benefits. Adyen's gross line is stable near 88% because scheme and interchange costs pass through, and its operating leverage shows in SG&A falling 4.2 points in two years. This confirms the power map rather than contradicting it: Amex's pricing power is visible in card fees, but it is spent on the value proposition that creates it. The confidence caveat is Adyen's 2026 step: EBITDA margin guided about 1 point lower with acquisitions and capex at 7%, so the next two years test whether leverage survives the move beyond payments.

Adyen runs the leaner engine by a wide, persistent margin; Amex's engine is efficient in overhead but structurally committed to paying for spend.

What would flip the call

The KPI pack: 12-24 months

MetricThresholdBy whenIf it hits, it favorsWhere published
Adyen net revenue growth, constant currencyFY2026 at or above 21% (guide 21-23%); H1 2027 at or above 18%Feb 2027 / Aug 2027AdyenShareholder letters
Adyen take rateAt or above 15.5bps in H2 2026 and H1 2027 (H1 2026: 16.2bps)Aug 2027Adyen (below 15bps favors Amex)Shareholder letters
Adyen EBITDA marginFY2027 at or above 52%; FY2028 above 55%Feb 2028 / Feb 2029AdyenAnnual report
Amex net card fee growth and average fee per cardFY2026 at or above 15%; fee per card at or above $140 by Q4 2027 (Q2 2026: $131)Jan 2027 / Jan 2028American Express10-Q, 10-K
Amex discount revenue as % of billed businessHolds at or above 2.20% (FY2025: 2.24%)FY2027 10-KAmex if held; below 2.18% favors Adyen10-K Table 5
Amex net write-off rate, principal, consumer and small businessAt or below 2.3% (FY2025: 2.0%)FY2027 10-KAmerican Express10-K Table 7
Where to spend your time
Spend the next hours on Adyen: a filing read of the H2 2025 and H1 2026 letters and interim statements focused on take rate by pillar and cohort, the Talon.One and Orb purchase accounting, and what the CFO transition means for the 2028 margin target. Amex's franchise is well understood; Adyen's forward mechanism is the one still open to being wrong.