Digital payments. ADYEN (Euronext Amsterdam) / V (NYSE). Run 17 September 2026. Built from the companies' own filings in the research folders: Adyen annual report 2025, ESEF financial statements FY2021 to FY2025, shareholder letters H2 2021 to H1 2026, April 2026 M&A call and August 2026 results call; Visa Form 10-K FY2023 to FY2025, Form 10-Q for the quarter to 30 June 2026, 8-Ks to July 2026 and the Q3 FY26 call. Events swept through 17 September 2026; most recent events checked: Adyen closed Talon.One and Orb on 1 July 2026 and raised 2026 guidance on 13 August 2026; Visa discovery in the DOJ debit case extended to January 2027 (Payments Dive, 31 August 2026). Adyen reports in EUR (calendar year), Visa in USD (fiscal year to 30 September); the duel compares ratios and growth rates, not absolutes. Where a size is converted, EUR/USD approx. 1.13, approx., unverified. Not a valuation and not a recommendation.
This is a duel across two layers of the same transaction, not two rivals for the same fee. Adyen is an acquirer and processor that pays Visa's scheme fees and passes them through to merchants (A AR 2025, revenue note), so every euro Adyen wins still flows over a card network. Visa's FY2025 net revenue of $40.0bn is roughly 15 times Adyen's EUR 2.36bn (approx. $2.7bn, approx., unverified), so everything below is compared as ratios. The weighting that decides the call: in payments, the party that sets price keeps the economics through the cycle, so the power lens counts most.
Adyen's next five years are carried by three cells whose drivers do not depend on consumer spending growth. North America (27% of net revenue, +30% cc in H1 26) and Unified Commerce (32%, +27% cc) grow by moving existing enterprise merchants onto one platform across channels: 486 merchants now process at least EUR 10m both online and in store, and in-person volume grew 28% to EUR 175.7bn. Platforms (11%, +40% cc) adds a second compounding curve, as SaaS platforms embed payments, issuing and accounts for their own merchants, 293K of them (A H1 26 letter). Visa's forward drivers are mix, not volume: value-added services (+32% 9M FY26) and commercial and money movement (+17% Q3 FY26) sit on top of a payments volume that grows 10% nominal (V 10-Q Q3 FY26; Q3 call). Visa guides FY26 net revenue growth to the low end of low teens; Adyen guides 21 to 23% cc including Talon.One and Orb, up from 20 to 22% before the deals (V Q3 call; A H1 26 letter).
Visa converts through price and mix: service and data processing revenue grew on "select pricing modifications" in FY2025 and again in FY2026, and VAS rides the same rails at little incremental cost, which is why net revenue per dollar of payments volume rose while client incentives also rose (V 10-K FY25; 10-Q Q3 FY26). Adyen converts through operating leverage only: EBIT margin climbed from 40.4% to 46.9% as employee costs fell from 36.5% to 32.0% of net revenue (A ESEF FY23 to FY25, inferred), but price moves the other way, because tiered pricing hands the largest merchants lower rates as they consolidate volume (A H1 26 call). This is the central tension of the duel: the growth winner and the margin winner are different companies. Adyen is a compounder whose unit price erodes as it wins; Visa is a fortress whose unit price rises while it grows at half Adyen's rate. Adyen's own target, EBITDA margin above 55% by 2028 (A H1 26 letter), would still leave it below Visa's ex-litigation EBIT margin of 66.4% (V 10-K FY25).
Adyen's exposure is commercial and annual. Large enterprise merchants work with several providers to avoid a single point of failure and "may terminate contracts or shift volume elsewhere" (A AR 2025); in FY2025 one large-volume customer's shift cut processed volume growth from 21% to 8% (A H2 25 letter). With 300 merchants still delivering 60% of growth, 550 to 650 planned net hires in 2026 and capex pulled forward to 7% of net revenue (A H2 25, H1 26 letters), a pricing war or a wave of volume re-allocation would hit growth and margin at the same time. Visa's exposure is legal and slow: the November 2025 settlement lets US merchants decline whole credit categories and cuts average credit interchange by 10 bps for five years (V 8-K 10 Nov 2025; final approval motion July 2026), the DOJ debit case is heading for a likely 2028 trial (Payments Dive, 31 Aug 2026), and one client alone is 11% of net revenue (V 10-K FY25). Visa's hits arrive over years through courts and contracts; Adyen's can arrive within two halves through merchant routing decisions, which is why Adyen breaks first.
These six flow x geography cells cover the bulk of both companies' net revenue; each company is scored on its position within its own layer of the flow (Visa as network, Adyen as acquirer), and every score is argued in the tabs below.
| Cell (flow x region) | Adyen | Visa | Why (one clause each, sourced) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Card and account payments, US / North America | 4 | 5 | Adyen NA net revenue +30% cc in H1 26 from share-of-wallet gains but still 27% of a small base (A H1 26 letter); Visa carries $6.8tn US payments volume and realized pricing, US net revenue +12% 9M FY26 (V 10-K FY25; 10-Q Q3 FY26) |
| Enterprise digital commerce, EMEA | 4 | 4 | Adyen EMEA is 55% of net revenue, +15% cc H1 26 (A H1 26 letter); Visa grew European credentials by over 40m in 12 months through portfolio migrations (V Q3 FY26 call) |
| In-person enterprise retail (unified commerce), global | 4 | 4 | Adyen UC +27% cc, 838K transacting terminals, +27% (A H1 26 letter); Visa earns on every tap but face-to-face grows slower than e-commerce (V 10-Q Q3 FY26) |
| Cross-border commerce, global | 4 | 5 | Visa international transaction revenue $14.2bn gross, cross-border volume +13% FY25 (V 10-K FY25); Adyen LatAm +35% cc and APAC +26% cc ride existing global merchants (A H1 26 letter) |
| Value-added services (risk, data, issuing tools), global | 3 | 5 | Visa VAS revenue $10.9bn FY25, +32% 9M FY26 (V 10-K FY25; 10-Q); Adyen risk and identity tools are bundled into its take rate, revenue ND (A AR 2025) |
| Platforms and embedded finance, global | 4 | 3 | Adyen Platforms +40% cc, 37 platforms above EUR 1bn, 293K active business customers +51% (A H1 26 letter); Visa CMS revenue +17% Q3 FY26, dollar size ND (V Q3 FY26 call) |
Scores are per cell and are not summed. Adyen never scores 5: it gains share in every cell but does not set price in any of them, which is the rubric's test for dominance.
Neither company discloses a product x geography matrix. Adyen reports three pillars (Digital, Unified Commerce, Platforms) and four billing regions separately (A H1 26 letter, note 1.1). Visa reports one segment, splits net revenue only into US and International, and gives four gross revenue lines plus a dollar figure for VAS (V 10-K FY25, note 14). The chart therefore pairs like-for-like geography rows first, then each company's comparable growth engines, which are not the same product. Region labels are normalized to North America/US versus the rest; Visa's "International" includes Canada, so the geography rows are close but not identical.
| Cell | Adyen rev (% of NR) | Adyen growth | Visa rev (% of NR) | Visa growth | Margin signal / leader |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North America / US | EUR 633m (27%) | +30% cc H1 26 | $15,633m (39%) | +6% FY25; +12% 9M FY26 | Visa: yield approx. 23 bps on US volume vs approx. 34 bps international (inferred, NR over 12m volume, V 10-K FY25); Adyen fastest region |
| EMEA / International | EUR 1,361m (58%) | +15% cc H1 26 | $24,367m (61%, all non-US) | +15% FY25; +17% 9M FY26 | Visa leads on price; Adyen EMEA growth slowed on lower market volume (A H2 25 letter) |
| APAC + LatAm | EUR 370m (16%) | +26% / +35% cc H1 26 | within International | ND | Adyen follows global merchants; Visa faces UnionPay in China and interchange caps in LatAm (V 10-K FY25) |
| Engines: UC + Platforms / VAS + CMS | EUR 1,029m (44%) | +27% / +40% cc | VAS $10.9bn (27%); CMS ND | +32% / +17% | Both growth engines outgrow the core; Visa's carry near-zero incremental network cost |
| Core: Digital / consumer card payments | EUR 1,335m (56%) | +15% cc H1 26 | ND (single segment) | PV +10% 9M FY26 | Adyen Digital take rate approx. 16.8 bps (inferred, H1 26); Visa sets the default rates |
Adyen figures FY2025 (A H2 25 letter: H1 plus H2), growth H1 2026 constant currency (A H1 26 letter). Visa FY2025 (V 10-K FY25), growth 9M FY26 reported including approx. 1pt FX (V 10-Q). Rows overlap across the geography and engine cuts; they do not sum.
Adyen's Unified Commerce engine is volume plus cross-sell: terminals +27%, in-person volume +28%, and a new layer from Talon.One loyalty (EUR 750m) and Orb usage-based billing ($335m), both closed 1 July 2026 (A M&A call 23 Apr 2026; A H1 26 letter). Guidance moved from 20 to 22% cc before the deals (A H2 25 letter) to 21 to 23% cc including them, with 2026 EBITDA margin now expected one point below 2025 (A H1 26 letter), so part of 2026 growth is acquired. Visa's VAS engine grew on client consulting (+30%), marketing tied to the FIFA World Cup and Winter Olympics, and pricing (V 10-Q Q3 FY26), so part of 2026's +32% is event-driven. Visa also buys growth: Featurespace (December 2024), Pismo, and Prisma and Newpay in Argentina for $1.5bn in February 2026 (V 10-K FY25; 10-Q).
Visa sells to issuers and acquirers under long-term contracts and sets default interchange, which it does not keep but which funds issuer loyalty to the brand (V 10-K FY25). It pays client incentives to hold volume (28.3% of gross revenue in FY2025, up from 27.4% in FY2023, inferred) yet still realizes "select pricing modifications" on service and data processing fees. Adyen sells direct to enterprises and platforms with interchange and scheme fees passed through to merchants (A AR 2025, revenue note), so the only price it controls is its markup, and that markup is tiered down as merchants bring more volume. Management's answer on pricing pressure: "existing merchants give us more and more volume and therefore come to lower tiers" (A H1 26 call).
Adyen's critical inputs are scheme access (Visa, Mastercard, Amex, RuPay on its own acquiring rails), partner banks where it lacks a licence, and data center capacity; management pulled 2027 capex into H2 2026 to lock in compute and storage "amid ongoing supply chain challenges" (A AR 2025; A H1 26 letter). Visa's inputs are its own data centers and staff; its one structural dependency is on clients or third parties to process cards in markets it cannot run end to end, such as Mexico and Thailand (V 10-K FY25).
| Input | Adyen | Visa |
|---|---|---|
| Network access | Depends on card schemes, including Visa | Owns the network |
| Balance sheet partners | Partner banks outside EU/US/UK licences, exposure capped at 25% of eligible capital | Settlement indemnity on client failures |
| Compute | Own data centers; capex 7% of NR in 2026 | Own data centers; capex 3.7% of NR FY25 (inferred) |
| Local processing | Local acquiring licences in key markets | Third parties in Mexico, Thailand; China via UnionPay pending |
In Visa's cells the reference competitors named in its own filing are Mastercard ($8.0tn payments volume against Visa's $13.4tn), American Express, UnionPay, and real-time payment networks such as PIX, UPI and FedNow (V 10-K FY25, citing Nilson Report June 2025). Visa is holding share in cards and expanding into A2A and stablecoin settlement. In Adyen's cells, competitors include larger merchant portfolios and players willing to price aggressively; Adyen states it has a "moderate risk appetite for price-based competition" and walks away from unsustainable deals (A AR 2025). Adyen is a share-taker in every region; Visa is a share-holder facing slow substitution at the domestic edge.
US credit (Visa): the settlement's category-level acceptance choice can let merchants refuse premium consumer or commercial credit, which lowers issuer economics and so raises the incentives Visa must pay. International (Visa): interchange caps in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and a proposed RBA cut in Australia, plus cross-border RTP linkages (V 10-K FY25). Digital (Adyen): re-routing by a few global online retailers, as in FY2025. Platforms (Adyen): take rate of approx. 12.3 bps in H1 26 (inferred) because platforms are large tiered customers, so the fastest cell is the lowest-yield one (A H1 26 letter and call).
One in-house platform across online, in-store and platforms, with its own banking licences in the EU, US and UK and direct acquiring connections (A AR 2025). Proof: churn below 1% excluding one merchant in 2025, share of wallet rising past 40% after 12 years, Google, Microsoft, Spotify and Uber still expanding after a decade (A AR 2025; A H1 26 letter). Durability: Medium. Licences and a single codebase take years, but a well-funded rival can build them, and customers multi-home.
A two-sided network: 4.8bn cards and $13.4tn payments volume, 16bn tokens provisioned, Tap to Phone on 20m devices (V 10-K FY25). Proof: net revenue per dollar of volume rising while paying 28% of gross revenue in incentives; Colony Bank debit win and European portfolio migrations in FY26 (V Q3 FY26 call). Durability: High. Acceptance and issuance must be rebuilt simultaneously, which money alone has not achieved for any new entrant; the attackers are regulators and RTP rails, not card rivals.
Visa: one client is 11% of net revenue in each of FY2023 to FY2025 and large clients can issue non-Visa cards on short notice (V 10-K FY25). Visa's price-setting shows in rising yield despite incentives rising from 27.4% to 28.3% of gross revenue. Adyen: top 10 merchants are 11% of revenue and no single customer exceeds 10% (A AR 2025), a healthier concentration profile, but its customers hold the pricing lever through volume tiers and multi-provider routing. Adyen's concentration is lower; Visa's pricing power is higher. Price beats concentration, so Visa wins narrowly.
Adyen: scheme fees and interchange are passed through to merchants (A AR 2025, note on settlement fees), so input cost shocks do not hit reported net revenue, but they do raise merchants' all-in cost and weaken Adyen's hand at renewal. Visa: no single-source input of note; people, marketing, fees and overhead are 84% of FY2025 operating expenses excluding litigation (inferred). Pass-through: Adyen strong on paper, Visa not needed. Dual sourcing: Adyen cannot dual-source network access.
| Cell | Route control | Pocket price | Continuity | Outcome (share / margin) | Confirming KPI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US / North America | Visa sets default rules; Adyen direct to merchants | Visa above (rising yield); Adyen below peers only when tiered | Visa legal overhang to 2028; Adyen strong | Adyen share up, margin flat; Visa share flat, margin flat to down as settlement bites | Visa US net revenue growth vs US volume growth, FY27 |
| Enterprise digital, EMEA | Visa via issuers; Adyen direct | Visa above; Adyen tiered | Both strong | Adyen share up, margin up on leverage; Visa share up via migrations | Adyen EMEA cc growth at or above 15% in H2 26 |
| Platforms / embedded | Adyen via platform partners; Visa via CMS and Pismo | Adyen lowest-yield pillar | Adyen dependent on a few very large platforms | Adyen share up, yield down; Visa early | Adyen Platforms take rate above 12 bps |
The tension: Adyen grows fastest exactly where it has the least pricing power (Platforms, large Digital merchants). That is the most important finding of the power map.
Three causes explain most of the gap. First, network effect versus platform quality (Major): Visa's acceptance and issuance lock-in versus Adyen's product lead; Adyen cannot close this, it can only move up the stack with loyalty, billing and money movement, a 5-year project at least. Second, who owns the pricing rule (Major): Visa publishes fees to thousands of clients; Adyen negotiates tiered deals, and this is inherent to acquiring. Third, labor intensity (Moderate): Adyen's enterprise sales and integration model needs people as it scales (4,771 FTE end 2025, 5,020 mid 2026); operating leverage narrows this, but not to a network's level.
Both income statements are presented by nature, so COGS and SG&A are proxies. Adyen: net revenue already deducts costs from financial institutions and other cost of goods sold (A H1 26 letter, note 1.1); COGS proxy is other cost of goods sold over (net revenue plus that line); SG&A proxy is employee benefits plus other operating expenses net of other income. Visa: COGS proxy is network and processing; SG&A proxy is personnel, marketing, professional fees and G&A; litigation provision is kept inside EBIT and shown separately. R&D is ND for both: neither reports an R&D line and both staff product work inside personnel costs. Years: Adyen calendar 2023 to 2025, Visa fiscal to September 2023 to 2025.
| % of net revenue, 3y avg | Adyen | Visa | Gap | What drives it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| COGS proxy | 4.6 | 2.2 | +2.4 | Terminal and processing costs at Adyen vs a network with shared processing |
| R&D | ND | ND | ND | No line reported by either |
| SG&A proxy | 50.6 | 28.0 | +22.6 | Enterprise sales and integration model; Adyen narrowing 54.3 to 47.3 |
| Gross margin proxy | 95.4 | 97.8 | -2.4 | Both near-pure service; proxy adds little signal |
| EBIT margin | 44.0 | 63.3 (66.8 ex-litigation) | -19.3 | People intensity; Visa's litigation 2.8 / 1.3 / 6.4% of NR |
| Adyen, EUR m | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenue | 1,626.1 | 1,996.1 | 2,364.2 |
| Other cost of goods sold (inside NR) | 89.5 | 89.7 | 102.3 |
| Employee benefits | 594.0 | 701.2 | 756.2 |
| Other operating expenses, net | 289.0 | 302.6 | 362.2 |
| D&A | 85.5 | 104.5 | 135.8 |
| EBIT | 657.6 | 887.8 | 1,109.9 |
| COGS % / SG&A % / EBIT % | 5.2 / 54.3 / 40.4 | 4.3 / 50.3 / 44.5 | 4.1 / 47.3 / 46.9 |
| Visa, USD m | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenue | 32,653 | 35,926 | 40,000 |
| Network and processing | 736 | 778 | 894 |
| Personnel + marketing + prof. fees + G&A | 9,047 | 10,057 | 11,330 |
| D&A | 943 | 1,034 | 1,220 |
| Litigation provision | 927 | 462 | 2,562 |
| Operating income | 21,000 | 23,595 | 23,994 |
| COGS % / SG&A % / EBIT % | 2.3 / 27.7 / 64.3 | 2.2 / 28.0 / 65.7 | 2.2 / 28.3 / 60.0 |
The SG&A proxy is the persistent gap: 22 to 27 points in all three years. Its mechanism comes from the power map: Adyen wins enterprise and platform volume through sales teams, integrations and support in offices across four regions, so revenue growth pulls headcount with it (FTE +249 in H1 26), while Visa's incremental volume and VAS arrive over existing rails and contracts. The gap is narrowing only from Adyen's side (54.3% to 47.3%) and Visa's own ratio drifted up slightly (27.7% to 28.3%) as it invested in VAS and acquisitions. The cost engine confirms the power map rather than contradicting it: the company with pricing power shows it in EBIT margin, not gross margin, because neither business has meaningful cost of sales. One nuance cuts against Visa: its litigation provision swings between 1.3% and 6.4% of net revenue, a cost of being the price-setter that Adyen does not carry.
| Metric | Threshold | By when | If it hits, it favors | Where published |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adyen take rate | At or above 16.0 bps (16.2 in H1 26) | Feb 2027 | Adyen | H2 2026 shareholder letter |
| Adyen organic cc net revenue growth guide for 2027 | At or above 20% | Feb 2027 | Adyen | H2 2026 shareholder letter |
| Adyen EBITDA margin | At or above 52% for FY2027, on track for above 55% in 2028 | Feb 2028 | Adyen | H2 2027 shareholder letter |
| Visa client incentives / gross revenue | At or below 28.5% | Nov 2026 | Visa | FY2026 Form 10-K |
| Visa VAS revenue growth | At or above 20% in FY2027 after the World Cup lapse | Nov 2027 | Visa | FY2027 Form 10-K |