Peer Duel: S&P Global vs Moody's

Credit ratings, benchmarks and financial data (SPGI / MCO)

23 September 2026

Evidence base: both companies' FY2023 to FY2025 10-Ks, Q2 2026 10-Qs, Q4 2025 and Q2 2026 earnings-call transcripts and 2026 8-Ks from the research folders (sources/), plus the SEC Office of Credit Ratings 2025 Staff Report on NRSROs. Events swept through 23 September 2026; most recent events checked: S&P Global completed the sale of its upstream energy software to SLB (1 September 2026); Moody's elected a new director (8-K, 12 August 2026).

Currency: US$ millions as reported by both companies; no FX conversion. S&P Global is shown ex Mobility (spun off 1 July 2026) unless stated. S&P Global is Company A, Moody's is Company B.

This is a comparison of business strength. It is not a valuation and not a recommendation, and it says nothing about either stock's price.

1. Verdict and the Three Answers

The call. S&P Global is the stronger business for the next 5 to 10 years. It owns three benchmark franchises (credit ratings, the S&P 500 index family, Platts commodity prices) where Moody's owns one, and it runs both businesses the two share, ratings and financial data, at a higher margin. The load-bearing fact: replaying the 2022 issuance collapse on FY2025 mix would cut about 16% of S&P Global's segment profit and about 27% of Moody's adjusted operating income, because ratings are 48% of S&P's segment profit and about 70% of Moody's (inferred from FY2025 segment data and the 2022 decline in both 10-Ks).

The lens weighting. The lenses split: Moody's narrowly wins growth rate, S&P wins margins and resilience. In a benchmark industry, the power to be the reference that other people's rules require is what compounds through cycles, so power and resilience are weighted above a half-point difference in growth.

Answer 1. Growth: Moody's, narrowly, on rate; S&P Global on breadth

Three cells carry the next five years. Ratings, in both regions, grow with refinancing walls and new borrowers: S&P expects about $11 trillion of rated debt to refinance over the next four and a half years, and AI infrastructure adds hyperscaler, data-centre and power issuance (S&P guides $250 to 300bn of hyperscaler issuance in 2026) (SPGI Q2 2026 call). Both agencies ride that tide equally, since US ratings revenue grew 21.9% a year at S&P and 22.4% at Moody's from FY2023 to FY2025, but Moody's gets more of it per dollar of revenue because 67% of its ratings revenue is transaction fees against 52% at S&P (FY2025 10-Ks).

The data and workflow cell is where Moody's pulls ahead: Moody's Analytics grows ARR 8 to 9% with 95% retention, led by KYC (+13%), lending and insurance cloud migration, while S&P's Market Intelligence runs about 6% ACV growth, with platforms such as Capital IQ growing low single digits and only the Kensho data feeds growing high single to low double digits (Q2 2026 calls, both). Equity indices are S&P's alone: asset-linked fees on $6.35tn of ETF assets that grow with markets and the shift to passive (SPGI Q2 2026 call). Weighting each cell's run-rate by revenue share gives roughly 7.7% a year for Moody's against 7.2% for S&P ex Mobility (inferred), a gap inside the noise; S&P guides 6 to 8% organic growth for 2026.

Answer 2. Margins: S&P Global, narrowly, and on better quality

The consolidated statements point the wrong way: Moody's shows a 72.8% gross-margin proxy against 68.8% at S&P (3-year averages). Segment data reverses it. On a like basis S&P Ratings earned 63.8% in FY2025 against 61.6% at Moody's MIS, and led in each year since FY2023, though the lead narrowed from 3.9 to 2.2 points (inferred basis: MIS adjusted operating income less MIS D&A). Market Intelligence earns about 32% before acquisition amortization against about 28% for Moody's Analytics on a comparable basis (MCO figure inferred, an upper bound). Mix adds Indices at 69% and Energy at 41% GAAP. Free cash flow was 35.6% of revenue at S&P and 33.4% at Moody's in FY2025, partly because Moody's capitalizes more software (capex 4.2% of revenue against 1.3%) (FY2025 10-Ks).

The tension. Moody's grows a little faster; S&P keeps a little more of each dollar. S&P is the fortress with a slower data arm. Moody's is the more levered ratings compounder with a faster but thinner analytics arm.

Answer 3. Vulnerabilities: Moody's breaks first

Moody's single exposure is the issuance cycle: ratings are 53% of revenue and about 70% of adjusted operating income, and two-thirds of ratings revenue is transaction fees (FY2025 10-K). In 2022 MIS revenue fell 28% and adjusted operating income 40%, about 89 cents of profit per lost dollar (FY2023 10-K). S&P's ratings behaved the same way (revenue -26%, profit -36%), but ratings are now 48% of its segment profit. S&P's own weak points differ: a bear market hits Indices asset-linked fees ($1,206m) almost one for one, and its balance sheet is more stretched, with gross leverage guided to 2.8x at end-2026, above its 2.0 to 2.5x target, to fund more than $7bn of 2026 buybacks (SPGI Q2 2026 call). Moody's carried $6.9bn of debt against $3.2bn of equity at 30 June 2026 (MCO Q2 2026 10-Q). In an issuance downturn Moody's breaks first; in an equity bear market with tighter credit, S&P's leverage leaves less room.

Segment-Geography Scorecard

Six cells cover 100% of both companies' continuing revenue (S&P ex Mobility). Scores are per cell and are not summed.

Rubric: 5 dominant in the cell and compounding (share + price + growth); 4 advantaged and gaining share; 3 holds position, grows with the market; 2 subscale or stagnant, holds only by discounting or legacy; 1 weak and losing share, or exiting; 0 no meaningful presence. Mobility (S&P, $1,747m in FY2025) was spun off on 1 July 2026 and is excluded.

2. Growth and Profitability Map

Normalization: both companies report US and non-US revenue at segment level, so cells use that grain. S&P's Market Intelligence and Moody's Analytics are merged into one data, research and workflow label. S&P's regional splits are of segment revenue including intersegment royalties (Ratings $175m); Moody's are of external revenue. Growth is FY2023 to FY2025 CAGR on reported revenue, which includes small acquisitions and divestitures on both sides.

S&P % of total uses FY2025 segment revenue ex Mobility ($13,789m before $200m eliminations); Moody's uses external revenue ($7,718m). Sources: FY2023 and FY2025 10-Ks, both.

Insight: 34% of Moody's revenue sits in one cell (US ratings) against 20% at S&P, and ratings growth is identical at the two agencies. Implication: Over a full cycle the growth gap is decided in data, where Moody's leads, and in indices, where only S&P plays. KPI: MA ARR growth minus MI organic revenue growth, quarterly; a gap under 2 points for four quarters removes Moody's growth edge. [Source: FY2025 10-Ks; Q2 2026 calls]

Ratings index path. Ratings segment revenue indexed to FY2021 = 100 reached 115 at S&P and 109 at Moody's in FY2025, after troughs of 74 and 72 in FY2022 (S&P Ratings: 4,097 / 3,050 / 3,332 / 4,370 / 4,724; MIS: 3,977 / 2,873 / 3,046 / 3,986 / 4,317; FY2023 and FY2025 10-Ks). S&P gained relative ground over the full cycle; since FY2023 the two have moved together.

Segment growth engines

Ratings. Growth is issuance volume times price. Both cite the same FY2025 drivers: tight spreads, refinancing, AI-related investment-grade issuance, CLOs and private credit (S&P private-market ratings +60% in Q2 2026; Moody's private-credit transactions +40%) (Q2 2026 calls). S&P billed $4.3tn in FY2025 (+11%); Moody's rated more than $2tn in each of Q1 and Q2 2026. Price shows up in the annuity line at both: Moody's recurring revenue rose on annual price increases and more monitored credits, S&P's on improved contract terms (FY2025 10-Ks). Ratings growth is essentially organic at both.

Data and workflow. Moody's Analytics grows by embedding in regulated workflows: KYC ARR +15% in FY2025, insurance catastrophe models migrating to its cloud platform with less than half of customers moved, and lending suites repriced on renewal (MCO FY2025 10-K; Q2 2026 call). S&P's Market Intelligence is being split into a fast Kensho data business and slower platforms to be consolidated for margin (SPGI Q2 2026 call). Both are partly bought: S&P added Visible Alpha (2024) and With Intelligence (2025); Moody's spent $227m on acquisitions in FY2025 and sold Learning Solutions in Q4 2025.

Indices. Asset-linked fees rose 22% in FY2024 and 15% in FY2025 as average ETF assets grew 33% and 24% (SPGI FY2025 10-K). Market levels do most of the work; more than $600bn of net inflows over the last year and asset-manager switches to S&P add the structural part (SPGI Q2 2026 call).

Insight: S&P's fastest-growing cell (Indices, +15% a year) is also its highest-margin cell; Moody's fastest-growing cell (KYC and Decision Solutions) sits in its lowest-margin segment. Implication: Each point of growth is worth more profit at S&P than at Moody's. KPI: S&P asset-linked fees / average ETF AUM, 2.73bps in FY2024 and 2.53bps in FY2025 (inferred; fees include mutual funds and OTC); below 2.3bps signals fee compression. [Source: SPGI FY2025 10-K, Indices MD&A]

Price control and route to market

Both sell direct. In ratings the issuer pays and has no substitute for the big-agency ratings that index and mandate rules require, so both raise prices annually. The difference is packaging: 48% of S&P Ratings revenue is non-transaction (surveillance, annual relationship fees, Crisil) against 33% recurring at Moody's (FY2025 10-Ks). Moody's notes that frequent issuers on pricing programs carry lower revenue yields, so higher bank and data-centre volume did not lift its 2026 revenue guide (MCO Q2 2026 call). In indices S&P prices by basis points on assets, a meter that runs with markets rather than negotiations.

Insight: S&P has converted more of its ratings pricing into annuity fees. Implication: Its ratings revenue falls less in a drought and its net price depends less on deal flow. KPI: MIS recurring share of ratings revenue (33% in FY2025); above 38% by FY2028 would close the gap. [Source: FY2025 10-Ks]

Supply resilience

Neither has physical supply risk; inputs are analysts, engineers, data and cloud capacity. Compensation is Moody's largest cost ($2,574m of 3,776m operating and SG&A; FY2025 10-K). S&P's one partner dependency is CME Group, which co-owns S&P Dow Jones Indices and holds a put on at least 20% of its stake (4.9bn redeemable non-controlling interest; SPGI FY2025 10-K). Moody's relies on AWS and Microsoft as distribution partners for its cloud and AI products (MCO Q2 2026 call).

Competitive context

Ten firms are registered NRSROs, but S&P, Moody's and Fitch held 93.38% of all outstanding ratings at end-2024, down from 94.15% a year earlier; the SEC staff names investment guidelines and index rules that specify these agencies, plus the QIB certification requirement, as barriers to entry (SEC OCR 2025 Staff Report, pp.3, 18, 29-30). Fitch publishes no financials. Both agencies hold share in ratings. In data, Moody's competes with software and data vendors and describes MA's markets as broad and competitive (MCO FY2025 10-K); S&P describes MI's market as intensely competitive (SPGI FY2025 10-K).

Risks by segment

• Ratings: an issuance drought hits both; Moody's more, because of its transaction weighting and profit concentration.
• Data: AI tools that let clients combine feeds from several vendors threaten stand-alone platforms first, which is S&P's slow-growing Capital IQ-type estate more than Moody's workflow-embedded KYC and insurance software; an analyst raised this on S&P's Q2 2026 call.
• Indices: a bear market cuts asset-linked fees directly; asset-manager switching works in both directions.
• Energy: geopolitics; S&P chose to be flexible on price with customers affected by the Iran conflict in 2026 (SPGI Q2 2026 call).

The growth call. On cells alone Moody's has the slightly faster engine, because its data arm outgrows S&P's; S&P has the broader one, because two of its cells have no Moody's counterpart and one of them is its highest-margin business.

3. Power Map

In this industry the power sits with whoever other people's rules point to: index eligibility rules, investment mandates, futures contracts and ETF prospectuses. Lever calls: Moats, S&P clear; Customers, S&P narrow; Suppliers, S&P narrow.

Moats

S&P Global: Ratings are named in bond-index and mandate rules alongside Moody's and Fitch (durability High). The S&P 500 underlies the first $1tn ETF, four of the five ETFs the US Treasury selected for Thrift accounts, and SPX derivatives; replacing it means rebuilding a liquid market (High). Platts assessments settle exchange contracts (High, with 2026 geopolitical noise).

Moody's: the same mandate-driven ratings moat, with an identical 2022 to 2025 path (High). Analytics: Orbis ownership data on more than 630m entities, catastrophe models for insurers, credit models embedded in bank lending, 95% retention (Medium: sticky, but a well-funded rival can buy its way in over time, and low-30s margins show the market does not treat it as a benchmark).

Insight: Both own the ratings moat equally; only S&P owns two further references that third parties have written into products and contracts. Implication: S&P's profit pool has three independent protections against one at Moody's; Moody's second business is protected by switching costs, not mandates. KPI: Net ETF flows captured by S&P DJI and asset-manager switches disclosed each quarter; a large switch away is the first crack. [Source: SEC OCR 2025 Staff Report pp.18, 29-30; Q2 2026 calls]

Customers

S&P Global: no customer above 10% of revenue; 48% of ratings revenue non-transaction; paid by asset managers on assets and by exchanges on volume in indices (SPGI FY2025 10-K).

Moody's: no customer above 10% of receivables; ratings recurring share 33%; MA 96 to 99% recurring with 95% retention and upsell on platform migrations; lower-yield pricing programs for frequent issuers dilute ratings price per dollar issued (MCO FY2025 10-K; Q2 2026 call).

Insight: S&P has turned more issuer relationships into annual fees and is paid by asset-based meters in indices; Moody's has the stickier software customer base. Implication: In a downturn S&P's net price holds better in ratings; in data Moody's holds customers better. KPI: MIS recurring share (33%) vs S&P non-transaction share (48%); MA retention at or above 94%. [Source: FY2025 10-Ks; MCO Q2 2026 call]

Suppliers

S&P: people and data, low capital intensity (capex 1.3% of revenue), CME partnership in indices. Moody's: people and cloud, capex 4.2% of revenue as it capitalizes software for MA's cloud shift, and it is sunsetting on-premise insurance models, which makes AWS a critical platform (FY2025 10-Ks; MCO Q2 2026 call). Both expanded margins through the post-2022 wage inflation once issuance recovered; neither shows input-cost stress.

Insight: Neither has a supplier that can dictate terms. Implication: Moody's carries more execution risk moving insurance customers to its cloud platform. KPI: Moody's capex below 3.5% of revenue once migration peaks; S&P capex under 2%. [Source: FY2025 10-Ks; MCO Q2 2026 call]

Price/power triangle: top 3 cells

The tension. Moody's grows fastest exactly where its pricing power is weakest (data, at roughly 28 to 34% margins), while S&P's pricing power is concentrated in cells Moody's does not contest.

The causal gap

• Index franchise (Major). S&P $1,850m at 69%; Moody's none. Not closable: decades and a liquid derivatives market.
• Ratings annuity mix (Moderate). 48% vs 33%. Partly closable over 3 to 5 years through relationship pricing and first-time mandates (Moody's expects 750 to 850 in 2026).
• Data arm economics (Moderate, moving toward Moody's). MI larger and more profitable; MA faster and targeting mid to high 30s margins by end-2027 (MCO Q2 2026 call). If MA gets there at 9% ARR growth, this cause flips within about two years.

The power call. S&P Global holds the stronger power position because it owns three references others must use; Moody's owns one, plus a good software business that must still earn its margins. Early warnings: S&P, net ETF flow capture and index fee rate; Moody's, MIS recurring share and MA retention.

4. Cost Engine

Both present costs by function under US GAAP with D&A on separate lines, so the mapping is clean: operating-related expenses (S&P) and operating expenses (Moody's) serve as the cost-of-revenue proxy; selling and general (S&P) and SG&A (Moody's) as SG&A. Neither discloses R&D (ND). S&P's reported EBIT carries $1.0 to 1.1bn a year of acquired-intangible amortization, mostly from IHS Markit, plus disposal gains or losses; Moody's carries $198 to 215m of acquired amortization plus restructuring. A second EBIT line removes acquired amortization (and S&P's disposal gains) from both. S&P figures include Mobility (not restated). Both fiscal years end 31 December.

Raw values ($m), S&P FY23/FY24/FY25: operating-related 4,141 / 4,361 / 4,563; selling and general 3,159 / 3,196 / 3,417; amortization of intangibles 1,042 / 1,077 / 1,069; (gain) loss on dispositions 70 / (59) / (273); operating profit 4,020 / 5,580 / 6,478. Moody's: operating 1,687 / 1,945 / 1,973; SG&A 1,632 / 1,735 / 1,803; D&A 373 / 431 / 480; restructuring 87 / 59 / 108; acquired amortization 198 / 198 / 215; operating income 2,137 / 2,875 / 3,351. Sources: FY2025 10-Ks, income and cash flow statements.

The structural gap

The most persistent gap is the operating-expense ratio: Moody's ran 3 to 5 points lower in each of the three years. It is not a cost-discipline story. It comes from mix, since Moody's is 53% ratings while S&P's cost base carried Energy, Mobility and Market Intelligence content operations, and from accounting, since Moody's capitalizes about three times as much of its revenue as capex, moving software cost from operating expense into amortization (inferred). At segment level the gap reverses: S&P Ratings out-earned MIS by 2 to 4 points every year and MI out-earns MA by about 4 points on a comparable basis. That confirms the power map: the company with more benchmark pricing power shows it where the businesses overlap, and in free cash flow (35.6% vs 33.4% in FY2025). Moody's lead in consolidated gross margin is a mix effect, not a cheaper engine.

The cost call. S&P Global runs the leaner engine segment for segment; Moody's looks leaner only because of what it does not own and what it capitalizes.

5. What Would Flip the Call

• Moody's Analytics becomes a second benchmark-quality business. ARR growth holds at 9% or better while adjusted margin reaches the mid to high 30s by end-2027, making Moody's the faster grower with comparable conversion. Early warning: MA adjusted margin at or above 36% with ARR growth at or above 9% in FY2027 (MCO 10-K).
• AI hollows out S&P's Market Intelligence platforms. MI is 36% of S&P revenue ex Mobility and its slowest grower; clients using AI front ends to combine vendors' feeds could consolidate away from Capital IQ-type platforms. Early warning: MI organic growth below 4% or ACV growth below 5% for two consecutive quarters (SPGI earnings calls; new two-line MI reporting from Q3 2026).
• Index fee compression or a bear market while leverage is above target. Asset-linked fees fall faster than assets, or AUM falls sharply with gross leverage still near 2.8x. Early warning: asset-linked fees / average ETF AUM below 2.3bps, or gross leverage not back inside 2.0 to 2.5x by end-2027 (SPGI 10-K; Q2 2026 call).

KPI pack: next 12 to 24 months

6. Where to Spend Your Time

Spend the first deep-dive hours on S&P Global, and specifically on Market Intelligence: it is the one segment that could break the call, and the new two-line reporting (Kensho Data and Platforms; Enterprise Solutions) from Q3 2026 will show whether the platforms are shrinking. For Moody's one question is enough to track: whether MA's margin reaches the mid-30s without its growth slowing.

Open questions the filings could not answer

• Price versus volume in ratings revenue growth: neither agency discloses the split.
• Ratings market share by revenue including Fitch, which publishes no financials.
• How much of Moody's $215m acquired amortization sits in MA versus MIS, which sets the exact data-arm margin comparison.
• S&P Market Intelligence retention and platform-level growth before Q3 2026; only ACV growth (about 6%) and qualitative commentary are disclosed.
• Revenue lost with the upstream software sale to SLB (S&P says not material; terms undisclosed).

Sources

• S&P Global Form 10-K FY2025 (filed 11 Feb 2026), FY2024 (11 Feb 2025), FY2023 (9 Feb 2024); Form 10-Q Q2 2026 (28 Jul 2026); 8-K on Mobility separation (2 Jul 2026). Research folder sources/.
• S&P Global earnings-call transcripts, Q4 2025 (10 Feb 2026) and Q2 2026 (28 Jul 2026).
• Moody's Form 10-K FY2025 (18 Feb 2026) and FY2023 (14 Feb 2024); Form 10-Q Q2 2026 (23 Jul 2026); 8-Ks of 12 Jan 2026 and 12 Aug 2026. Research folder sources/.
• Moody's earnings-call transcripts, Q4 2025 (18 Feb 2026) and Q2 2026 (22 Jul 2026); investor update on AI (8 Jun 2026).
• SEC Office of Credit Ratings, 2025 Staff Report on NRSROs (April 2026): https://www.sec.gov/files/2025-ocr-staff-report-compliant-4-24-26.pdf
• S&P Global press release on completing the upstream software divestiture to SLB (1 Sep 2026): https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sp-global-completes-divestiture-of-upstream-energy-software-portfolio-to-slb-302866534.html
• Moody's Q2 2026 earnings release (22 Jul 2026): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1059556/000162828026049104/a2q26earningsrelease.htm

Method: three lenses (growth map by product x region cell, power map, cost engine over three years) converge on a call. Cells cover 100% of continuing revenue. ND means not publicly disclosed; inferred marks a figure reasoned from disclosed data with the logic stated.